В статье рассматривается категория джама’ в арабском языке в сравнении с концептом «сборки» Делеза. Автор утверждает, что категории джама’ принадлежит центральная роль в формировании арабской языковедческой науки, исламской теологии, исламского права, суфизма, а также ряда современных исламских дискурсов, таких как концепция васатийа. Эта категория также используется в ряде социальных, экономических и политических построений в современных арабских государствах. В данной статье автор исследует теоретические основания концепции джама’ и ее влияние на формирование арабского языкознания и классического арабского языка. Отталкиваясь от этимологического анализа понятия джама’, автор рассматривает концепт «сборки», в интерпретации Делеза и Гваттари, после чего переходит к исследованию самой категории джама’ в трех аспектах: 1) назм как вид джама’ и способ артикуляции смыслов, 2) влияние концепции джама’ на формирование арабской метафоры и 3) сравнение теологических и философских оснований арабского концепта джама’ с делезианским пониманием виртуального и бергсоновским понятием времени.

In this article, I explore the Arabic concept of jam‘, and relate it to the Deleuzian concept of assemblage. I argue that jam‘ is central in the formation of Arabic language, Islamic theology, Islamic law, Sufism, a number of modern Islamic discourses, such as wasaṭiyyah, and several social, economic, and political formations in Arab modern states. I will limit my scope in this article to establishing the theoretical foundations of jam‘ and studying its effect on the formation of language. After defining jam‘ etymologically, I will present a brief discussion of assemblage, as presented in Deleuze and Guattari, and then will divide the rest of the article into three parts, where I will discuss, first, the concept of naẓm as a type of jam‘ that aims to articulate meaning, second, the effect of jam‘ on the formation of the metaphor, and, third, the theological and philosophical foundations of jam‘ in the Deleuzian understanding of virtuality, and the Bergsonian understanding of time.

Keywords: jam‘, naẓm, metaphor, assemblage, Gurgānī, Deleuze.
The Meaning of Jam`

In Lisân al-‘Arab (Ibn Manzûr, 1981, pp. 678–682), jam‘ is bringing together what was scattered or sparse. On the one hand, it is bringing the scattered from each place. On the other hand, the place where the scattered are gathered is called majma‘. In the Qur’ân, Moses is ordered by God to meet a man, the like of whose knowledge Moses does not have. The place where Moses, the carrier of law, met this man, whose knowledge is mystic beyond reason and law, is called majma‘ al-bâhrayn, or the meeting point of the two seas (Qur’ân, 18:60). Unlike ijmâ‘, consensus, which indicates a rational and consistent meeting of opinions and choices, that which is scattered and gathered in jam‘ is necessarily dissimilar in quality or kind. For instance, one of God’s names is al-Jâmi‘, for He gathers in the Day of Judgment what in this world is similar or contradictory. A group of people is jam‘ min al-nâs, or jamâ‘ ab. The semantics in Arabic protect spaces for differences, and gaps for contradictions. Jam‘ somehow defies rational classifications. For instance, Arabs classified dates into a variety of groups, each of which has its own name. However, one meaning of jam‘ is an unnamed group of dates, its individuals belong to different kinds of the fruit. An army is jam‘ too. If we use the emphatical form jumma‘ then it is a hodgepodge of peoples. It seems, nevertheless, that jam‘ includes a sort of arrangement that, in spite of internal differences or tensions, it successfully keeps its individuals together. For instance, the process of jam‘ al-Qur‘ân refers not merely to bringing all the scattered pieces of Qur‘ân together in one book, but also to putting them in an order that creates specific chapters, and then ordering the chapters to create the complete book. Similarly, jam‘ al-thyâb, that is, bringing different pieces of clothing together, is getting dressed to meet people. The different pieces, once subjected to the process of jam‘, make one meaningful and socially acceptable appearance.

That sense of unity, which we find in the Qur‘ân or in dress is further clarified in other meanings of jam‘. In Ḥadîth, Al-Nisâbûrî (2006) “The creation of each one of you is yujma‘, gathered, in his mother’s womb for forty nights” (p. 1022). The creation of a human being, therefore, is seen as a process of jam‘ of men and women’s fluids, as well as a variety of materials that are pulled from the mother’s blood stream. As an ongoing process, jam‘ does not seem to have a logical final end. The mujtami‘ man is a man who has reached his full power. In Ḥadîth, Ibn Ḥanbal (1993), the Prophet is described as walking mujtami‘, that is, walking composed and in full power (vol. 5, p. 160). When a woman reaches her full maturity, it is said that she jama‘ at the clothes. The virgin woman is called jum‘ and so is the woman who dies before giving birth; she too is said to die in jum‘. Psychologically, jam‘ refers to unifying one’s intentions and will. Saying that someone yujmi‘ amrâb means getting himself together with determination after some hesitation. Preparation, strong will, and consistency in intention are ijmâ‘. Obviously the more consistent the status is, the more it is ijmâ‘ rather than jam‘. In Lisân, ijmâ‘ is gathering the scattered in a way that it won’t scatter again. As I wrote above, jam‘ always comes with spaces and gaps of differences and contradictions, a sort of instability that is inherent to the jam‘.

Before moving to the next section, where I will explore the concept of assemblage, it is appropriate to mention here that jawâmi‘ al-kalim has been considered a central feature of one’s eloquence. Jawâmi‘ al-kalim refers to the skill of bringing together in speech many meanings in few words.
THE ASSEMBLAGE

The concept that I will use to analyze *jamr*, elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari, is assemblage. Unlike structuralists, who see an undifferentiated life that is differentiated by language, Deleuze and Guattari, by reversing this relationship, believe that life is a flow of differences, which language reduces. According to Colebrook (2002), we “are the contractions and contemplations of difference, an oscillation between how much difference we take in (contemplation) and how much difference we reduce or do not perceive (contraction)” (pp. 81–82). Assemblages are the connections of these differences, the forms of life that we recognize. All things in life exist as assemblages: human bodies, trees, birds, rocks, concepts, language, books. Those, however, are *machinic*, not organic, assemblages. They are not built on preconceived structures. A structure is “synchronic and static. A machine, on the other hand, is dynamic and diachronic. It is a temporal form of organization” (Lecercle, 2002, p. 181). Therefore, laws and orders do not create assemblages. It is the other way around: the internal connections of an assemblage are what create orders and laws.

Deleuze and Guattari argue for two types of assemblage machines: the molecular machines of desire, and a conglomerate of them that create the molar social machine. In other words, “the two aspects of the machine, the desiring and the social, prefigure the two aspects of the assemblage: the machinic assemblage of desire and the collective assemblage of enunciation” (Lecercle, 2002, p. 183). It is important here to recall the famous example, which Deleuze and Guattari used frequently to explain the assemblages: the orchid and the wasp. Together, they make an assemblage, not two organic assemblages in a relationship. An assemblage of language, therefore, is a mixture of bodies, utterances, practices, and forces. The assemblage, which is the minimal unit of language, “involves multiplicities of various kinds: populations, territories, becomings, affects, events” (Lecercle, 2002, p. 186).

To understand how an assemblage, or *jamr*, works, we need to understand the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of these concepts. Deleuze and Guattari reject all representative systems and they do that by refuting idealism, objectivism, and structuralism. In Platonic idealism, real ideal forms exist as imperfect copies. There are differences among the copies, as well as between the copies and their real forms. In objectivism, the images of thought represent facts of existence, and differences exist among these images as well as between them and the real facts of existence. In structuralism, the semiotic system of signs creates both reality and thought. Differences, therefore, emerge among those signs themselves. Deleuze and Guattari focus on difference but they reverse the relationship between difference and reality. They propose pure difference that precedes and creates all forms, facts, and signs. As Paul Patton wrote, “The production of a concept of difference ‘in itself’ goes hand in hand with the elaboration of an ontology in which disparity or difference is the fundamental principle and the identity of objects is understood as something produced from the differences of which they are composed” (Patton, 2000, p. 34). For our limited purpose in this brief discussion here, we need to understand that an assemblage is not a collection of identities—be they signs, concepts or facts—but, on the contrary, each individual identity is, in fact, an assemblage and a product of assemblages. They portray a world in flux, where differences create assemblages that continuously create, deconstruct and recreate identities.

The question now is how a certain identity could be constituted out of difference? Deleuze uses Bergson’s concept of multiplicity to replace the ideal/copy, the object/image, or the signified/signifier with the virtual/actual. In addition to numerical multiplicities, De-
Deleuze writes: “The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: it is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 38). Contrasting the virtual to the possible, Deleuze writes that the virtual “does not have to be realized, but rather actualized; and the rules of actualization are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 97). Thus, while the real is in the image of the possible, the actual is different from the virtual, from which it was actualized by a process of differenciation: a process that precedes the differentiation of the actual.

The actual and the virtual are different, yet, they are not separate, and they both make the real. In “The Actual and The Virtual,” Deleuze writes that each multiplicity is “composed of actual and virtual elements. Purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images” (Deleuze, 2007, p. 148). In Difference and Repetition, he puts it clearly as he writes: “Every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 209). Actuality here “is unfolded from potentiality” (Colebrook, 2010, p. 10), that is, the potentiality of the virtual. Deleuze argues of a plane of immanence on which we find both the virtual and its actualization. By using Spinoza’s concept of a plane of immanence, Deleuze emphasizes a philosophy of life that avoids all forms of transcendence. Immanent here refers, as Tod May wrote, to all planes of discourse, while transcendent refers to the outside of all planes of discourse (May, 1994, p. 38).

Linguistically, the conflation of the virtual and the actual blurs the separation of langue from parole. There are no independent structures outside the speech act. Assemblages are unities, but they are not classical systems. They are not formed based on a preconceived structure, and they do not have organic relationships among their parts. Language in Deleuze, much like other forms of life, is in a continuous process of creation—a creation of assemblages. Here, the created assemblage is formed of words, meanings, things, bodies. As a collective enunciation, every speech is social. There is no meaning outside the assemblage, and Deleuze’s focus in language is not meaning, but action, what languages does. Deleuze’s pragmatics “deals with actions, with the exertion of forces over things, and even if it abstracts concepts of ontological mixture, no longer at a safe remove from the world they describe, in the ghostly realm of representation and intentionality” (Lecercle, 2002, p. 161). Deleuze argues that the elementary unit of utterance is not the statement, but is mots d’ordre, which is translated literally as word-order, but Jean-Jacques Lecercle translates it as slogan, for, he explains, “the utterance is not merely the locus of a speech-act ... but of a social act” (Lecercle, 2002, p. 88). Slogans are crossed by forces and interests, two essential concepts in the formation of the assemblage in Deleuze. The mots d’ordre are issued by collectivities, in a context of forces, and they serve interests. Thus, again, the focus is not the truth of the declarative statement, but what language does.

A critical concept in Deleuze’s work is expression—a concept he borrows philosophically from Spinoza, but linguistically from Hjelmslev. Deleuze explains that the concept is old and had surfaced frequently in Christian philosophy but was immediately repressed by transcendence. He praises Spinoza for finally freeing the concept and writes that Spinozism “asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything. And such
a result can be obtained only within a perspective of univocity” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 180). The plane of expression is a plane of consistence anchored in the plane of immanence, and it creates unity out of difference. He writes: “It is in the idea of expression that the new principle of immanence asserts itself. Expression appears as the unity of the multiple” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 176). This is the time to turn our attention to this expression in language.

**The Assemblage/Jam’ in Language**

In this section, I will present the dynamics of jam’ as represented in the works of a number of medieval Arabic grammarians and semioticians. I will do this in three steps. First, I will explore the theory of meaning and the formation of speech by studying the concept of naẓm. I will focus on naẓm as a specific kind of jam’: the jam’ in language. Second, I will briefly study those medieval grammarians and semioticians’ conceptualization of the metaphor. My focus on the metaphor aims to present a priority of difference over identity, which is an essential feature of Deleuze’s philosophy and his concept of assemblage. Third, I will briefly present the main features of the theoretical and theological assumptions, on which jam’ is grounded.

**Naẓm**

Several Muslim authors, starting from the fourth and fifth Hijri centuries, paid special attention to naẓm, as they considered it the single feature of the Qur’anic language that perfects its eloquence far beyond the capacity of any Arab speaker. Most prominent in this field is al-Gurgānī’s (D. 1078 CE/471 H) book Dalā’il al-I’jāz, where he argued that naẓm is the single feature that creates the challenge of proving the divine origin of the Qur’an.1 In Lisān al-‘Arab, naẓm is to thread pearls on one necklace. Naẓm is indeed a special kind of jam’. To naẓm a book is to author it, and so is to ta’liṣ a book, where ta’liṣ means gathering—or jam’—its pieces together. Unlike in English, where writing a book refers to authority, in Arabic, much as Deleuze argued, writing a book is a sort of jam’ or assemblage. Naẓm does not necessarily refer to organic unity. For instance, the stars in the sky are called naẓm, for somehow, and as particles of an assemblage, they have relationships of exteriority, without creating a whole unified organically. Saying that the rocks tanāẓamat means they were put adjacent to each other. Naẓm is arrangement as well, but again without assuming internal organic coherence or consistency. In Ḥadith, it seems nizām refers to the assemblage of the entire world, so that the sign of the end of this world is a sequence of apocalyptic disasters that resemble, in the way they follow each other, an old worn out nizām whose thread was cut so that its pieces fall one after the other (Al-Tirmidhī, 1996, vol. 4, p. 71). Nizām is also order, so naẓm al-kalām is arranging words in order, or mots d’ordre, as Deleuze would have put it. Interestingly here is the modern translation of the English word systems into Arabic nizām, in spite of the qualitative difference in meaning between the two words, but perhaps as a necessity in an Arabic language that does not indeed have a word that could signify systems in the Greek and Latin etymological sense of the word.

Arabic grammar, as Māmūd al-Ṭanāḥī argued, can be divided into two types: nāḥw al-ṣanʿ ab and nāḥw al-tarākīb, or artificial grammar and constructions grammar. Artificial

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1. Al-Gurgānī is known in both Arabic non-Arabic literatures as al-Jurjānī, since Arabic does not have the letter g. I decided to use al-Gurgānī, for he received this name as he was born and lived all his life in the Persian town Gurgān. I am using challenge, not miracle, to translate i’jāz; for linguistically and theoretically i’jāz does not mean miracle, as I will explain in a future article on Naẓm al-Qur’an.
grammar is the system of logical rules and structures that were deduced out of the Arabic language, as spoken and written by Arabs in the second and third Hijri centuries. It is made of “a system, rules, definitions and forms” (Al-Ṭanāḥī, 2002, pp. 444–445). The constructions grammar, however, is nazm; it is “the interrelationships among pieces of the speech” (Al-Ṭanāḥī, 2002, p. 445). In Al-Bayān wa Al-Tabyīn, al-Jāḥiz writes that meanings are “covered and hidden, distant and wild, veiled and guarded, and present in the sense of being absent” (Al-Jāḥiz, 1998, vol. 1, p. 75). He contrasts meanings to words and writes that “meanings are not like words, for meanings are expanding beyond limit, and extending beyond end, but the names of meanings are limited and counted” (Al-Jāḥiz, 1998, vol. 1, p. 76). Therefore, single words by themselves are incapable of delivering meanings. This argument is explained in many works, for instance, in Ibn Taymiyyah, who argues that the single word does not signify a meaning by itself (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004, vol. 20, pp. 413–415). Al-Gurgānī, in Asrār al-Balāḡbāb, writes that “Words have no significance unless they are gathered together (tuʿallaf) in a special way of gathering (taʿlīf), and then they are selectively constructed and arranged” (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, p. 4). Emphasizing that it is nazm, not words, that creates eloquence, al-Gurgānī, in Dalāʿ il al-Ijāz, writes, “You see two men using the same words, but one of them has risen above the stars, and the other is stuck in the mud” (Al-Gurgānī, 1984, p. 48). He argues that it is impossible to use the same words, but in different nazm, and yet indicate the same meaning (Al-Gurgānī, 1984, pp. 261, 266). This nazm of words matches, he argues, the nazm of meanings in the heart (nafs) and the mind (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, p. 5). Between the virtuality of meaning, and the actuality of speech, eloquence is found. Eloquence here, the creation of assemblages of speech, is never absolute. Meanings cannot be mechanically and completely revealed. This is why speakers can always be compared in terms of their eloquence. In addition, the best eloquence is one that comes naturally, sajīyyah. The more the speaker rationally works and intervenes in reaching the hidden meaning, the less eloquent she is. Praising Jarīr (653–728 CE/33–110 H) over al-Farazdaq (641–732 CE/38–110 H) in composing poems, Mālik Ibn al-Akhṭal (640–710 CE/19–92 H) said, “Jarīr scoops from an ocean; al-Farazdaq chisels rocks” (Al-Jāḥiz, 1998, vol. 2, p. 273).

Eloquence, therefore—the actualization of the virtual meaning, the production of an assemblage of speech, that is, nazm—has to come out conveniently, effortlessly, not rationally or deliberately. This undefined convenience that the audience feel connects them with the hidden meaning, but without accurately defining it, or completely revealing it, so that it remains, as al-Jāḥiz said above, “present in the sense of being absent”. This is why al-Gurgānī situates meaning not merely in the mind but also in the heart (nafs). Rejecting mere objectivity, Muṣṭafā Naṣīf conceptualizes this convenience as arīḥyyah, and writes, “The concept of construction (nazm) is built on a base of arīḥyyah, and, from some aspects, it remains subjective” (Naṣīf, 2000, p. 52). Al-Jāḥiz defines the eloquence of speech as “reaching the best comprehension by the least letters, easy in coming out without deliberation ... its meaning is at the same level of its words, the speed of its meaning to the heart is as fast as the speed of its words to the ear” (Al-Jāḥiz, 1998, vol. 1, p. 111). Explaining the difficulty in rationalizing nazm, al-Gurgānī (1984) writes,

It (nazm) is to unify pieces of the speech, to integrate them into each other, to tie the connection between the second (piece) to the first, to make all of them fall in the heart harmoniously, to be like the builder, who puts with his right hand something in a spot, while placing with his left hand something else in a different spot, as he watches over a third and fourth spots that he will fill in once he is done with the first two. The work that this is its
description cannot have an exclusive definition, or an inclusive law. It comes in different ways, and with different aspects (p. 93).

This is the assemblage of nazm that defies rational laws. The beauty of its unity is appreciated only by the heart!

Rationality in assembling the speech is not completely rejected, however: it is only restricted. The sphere of rationality is naḥw al-ṣan‘ ab, the artificial grammar, which Arab grammarians consider as inferior to nazm, or the grammar of constructions, in creating the eloquent speech. In addition, the rational laws of naḥw al-ṣan‘ ab are a product of induction from the real assemblages of language, not a replica of preconceived logical rules. In the famous debate between al-Ṭāhir, the grammarian, and Matta, the logician, as recorded by Ibn Ḥayyān, al-Ṭāhir argues that grammar is not inferior to logic, for “grammar is logic abstracted from Arabic, while logic is grammar understood by language” (Al-Tawḥīdī, 1992, p. 75). Throughout the long debate, al-Ṭāhir articulates two arguments. The first argument, he asserts, is methodological: rules and laws can be known by induction not deduction. It is incorrect to apply logical rules on the assemblages of language. The only way to discover the laws of language is by “observation (tutabbū’), narration, listening, and the analogy that is based on a well-known case without alteration” (Al-Tawḥīdī, 1992, p. 80). Language, as Deleuze argues, is a collective enunciation. Thus, grammar is a social structure known through examining the socially-used language, not through any abstract logical laws. Second, al-Ṭāhir argued strongly that logic, kalām, itself is no less social and cultural. There is no universal logic. Al-Ṭāhir tells Matta that thinking is conducted through language. Therefore, his logic is limited by the Greek language. To prove his point, al-Ṭāhir challenges Matta with logical questions that can be solved only with a good understanding of grammar and asks him “Do you find this in your grammar?” (Al-Tawḥīdī, 1992, p. 78). If pieces of Arabic grammar are missing in Greek grammar, how dare Matta claim universality for Greek logic? In addition, to discuss Greek logic in Arabic, Matta has to translate it into Arabic. How would Matta do this if he is not a native speaker of Greek, and is not knowledgeable in Arabic grammar? Is not it impossible to create one body of universal meanings out of Arabic, Greek, Turkish, Persian, and Hindi? (Al-Tawḥīdī, 1992, pp. 75–78).

The Andalusian Ibn Maḍā‘ (1120–1196 CE/513–592 H), two centuries later, in his book *The Response to the Grammarians* criticized al-Ṭāhir, among other grammarians, for being unnecessarily too bound to Greek logic. Ibn Maḍā‘ argued against the theory of al‘Āmil, the regent, which assumes a regent that caused the case endings (Al-Ṭūbī, 1982, p. 76). Ibn Maḍā‘ (1982) argued that the only regent is the speaker herself. He rejected the grammarians’ assumption of ‘awāmil maḥḍūfah omitting regents (p. 78). Why do we need to assume missing words, if the meaning of the sentence is clearly understood by its speakers? In addition, Ibn Maḍā‘ (1982) finds the grammarians’ illab, cause, of case endings as nonsense (p. 130). The only illab is that this is how Arabs talk! Rational analogy in language, qiyās, is equally rejected (Al-Ṭūbī, 1982, p. 134). The morphology, case endings, and moods of words are known by observing the Arabs’ speech, not by any rational procedure, which the real speech act may or may not follow. All impractical exercises in grammar should be removed from the corpus of grammar (Al-Ṭūbī, 1982, p. 138). If they are not used in our speech, why would we need to learn them? What Ibn Maḍā‘ is indeed rejecting is turning a Deleuzian assemblage of language into a De Saussurian independent structure of langue.

2. The editor of al-Muṣṭāḥfasāt changed the original “your grammar” into “your logic”, claiming that it was a mistake of the scribes. I returned back to “your grammar,” for al-Ṭāhir is indeed referring to differences in languages and their grammars that affect the logic induced from them.
In *Al-Khaṣāʾis*, Ibn Jinnī (941–1002 CE/322–392 H) asserts that the Arabs’ real speech act comes before any rational rules of grammar. He writes: “You find, in much of poetry and prose, conflicts between grammar and meaning. One of them invites you to something, while the other prohibits it. When they both encounter certain speech, you should hold on the meaning, and comfortably justify the grammar” (Ibn Jinnī, 1952, vol. 3, p. 255). It is, however, this rational justification of grammar that Ibn Maḍāʾ finds unnecessary, not that the grammarians would prioritize their grammar over meaning. Ibn Jinnī gives an example: “your family and the night!” Grammatically, it is an incomplete sentence, and a grammarian would be waiting to know what is about your family and the night. In terms of meaning, the sentence is correct, the assemblage of family and night using the conjugation letter wāw is enough to deliver a known meaning: catch your family before the darkness of night! The examples are countless. Ibn Maḍāʾ, for instance, uses this example: *hadha juṭru ḍabbin kharbin*. Grammatically, the last word should have been *kharbun*. Nonetheless, it is *kharbin* because this is how the Arabs assembled it. In other words, for this word to be gathered in an assemblage, it has to change its form from the one it would have had, had it been integrated in a merely logical structure (Al-Qurūbī, 1982, p. 84).

Before moving to the next section, we need to ask if there is a moment where eloquence may reach its perfection. MuṣṬafā Naṣīf (1997) answers this question by writing, “*al-ṭayy, stuttering, is the perfection of eloquence, balāghab*” (p. 113). In fact, he defines the objective of his entire book as “conceptualizing the difficulties of using language” (MuṣṬafā Naṣīf, 1997, p. 14). Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2002), for his part, writes that stuttering for Deleuze is poetic language, and the hero of stuttering “is the exiled poet, who subverts *langue* and aims at the noble form of silence, the silence of the ineffable” (p. 234). He makes stuttering a corner stone of how he conceptualizes Deleuze’s theory of language. Deleuze provides him with the basic argument in his chapter “He Stuttered” (Deleuze, 1994). Deleuze (1994) argues that language itself, *language*, not just the speech, stutters: it quivers and vibrates. The system of language is in a perpetual state of disequilibrium. If the system “bifurcates—and has terms each one of which traverses a zone of continuous variation—language itself will begin to vibrate and to stutter” (p. 24). Equilibrium and disequilibrium of language are blended in speech. Deleuze sees the language of disequilibrium, stuttering language within the speech, as akin to the minor keys in music, so the great writers such as Kafka “invent a *minor use* for the major language within which they express themselves completely: they *minorize* language, as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in a state of perpetual disequilibrium” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 25). Language is in equilibrium as long as paradigmatically it is exclusive and syntagmatically it is progressive. Stuttering language, Deleuze (1994) argues, happens by making its disjunctions inclusive, and its connections reflexive: these are language’s two stutterings. He writes, “Each word is now divided, but it is divided in itself (fat-cat fatalist-catalyst); and it is also combined with itself (gate-rogate-abrogate)” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 26). Deleuze’s assemblage, as we know, is a mode of segmentation: it territorializes, reterritorializes, and deterritorializes desire. Stuttering opens the way for syntactic creativity and agrammaticality—that is deterritorialization.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write, *It is easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even nonlinguistic elements in variation, both variables of expression and variables of content. A new form of redundancy, AND*
... AND ... AND ... There has always been a struggle in language between the verb être (to be) and the conjunction et (and) between est and et. (p. 98).

This logic of “and” that Deleuze and Guattari prefer over the logic of “is” in stammering language is familiar to the speakers of Arabic. A sentence such as “Zayd is brave, handsome, persistent, and generous” once transformed into Arabic will be “Zayd brave and handsome and persistent and generous” so that the verb “to be” is omitted and the conjunction “and” is repeated. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write that the verb to be “acts in language as a constant and forms the diatonic scale of language”, while the conjunction “and” “places everything in variation, constituting the lines of a generalized chromaticism” (p. 98). Interestingly, to prove that the logic of Arabic is different than the logic of Greek, al-Sirāfi, in his debate with Matta, challenged him with one example: the wāw [and]. Al-Sirāfi argued, “I ask you about one letter that is common in the language of the Arabs ... Go find its meaning in Aristotel’s logic that you are so proud of! It is wāw: what are its rules? What are its different positions? And does it have one or several functions (wajh wāhid aw wujūd)?” (Al-Tawhīd, 1992, p. 74). After repeating the challenge several times, al-Sirāfi eventually explains how this conjunction letter has several and different functions, and says to Matta, “Do you find this in your grammar?” (Al-Tawhīd, 1992, p. 78).

Deleuze (1994) praises Dante for having listened to the stutterers, and for having studied all the mistakes of elocution, “not only in order to assemble discursive effects, but rather in order to undertake a vast phonetic, lexical, and even syntactic creation” (p. 25). A half a millennium before Dante, al-Jāḥiz, in his book on eloquence, Al-Bayān, included chapters on its opposite: al-‘ayy, or stuttering. In the second volume of his book, we find two chapters on speeches that include laṭn, or grammatical errors. He includes four chapters of speeches of those who are known to be fools, idiots, or crazy, and a chapter on stuttering. Much like Deleuze’s appreciation of the schizophrenic deterritorialization and the creativity in finding new lines of connections, al-Jāḥiz (1998) includes poetry of al-Numayrī, and writes that he “was more crazy than Ju‘ayfarān, and he was the most poetic of people!” (vol. 2, p. 229). In volume four, al-Jāḥiz again includes three chapters on the speeches of the fool, the stupid and the crazy. Here is an interesting example from the speech of the crazy.

He (‘Alī Ibn ʿIshāq Ibn Yahya Ibn Muʿādh) sat with some soldier boys, who pretend to be reasonable, muta‘āqil. The slave trader came by and said, “We are not into evaluating bodies. We evaluate organs, a ‘dā’ā. The price of this one’s nose is twenty-five Dinar. Her ears are eighteen, the eyes seventy-six, and the head with nothing of her senses one hundred”. So one of his friends pretending to be reasonable said, “There is a wiser way to do this. This one’s foot should have been with that one’s leg; the toes of that one should have been on the foot of the other one, this one’s lips should have been on the mouth of that one over there; and the eyebrows of that one should go on the forehead of this one”. So he was called the organ evaluator (Al-Jāḥiz, 1998, vol. 4, p. 16).

Al-Jāḥiz took this speech seriously enough to include it in his book, and so should we. How far different is this speech from the first paragraph in Deleuze and Guattari’s Antí-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia? There, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) write:

The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal machine, a talking machine, or...
a breathing machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy-machine: all the time, flows and interruptions (pp. 1–2).

Whether in al-Jāḥīz or in Deleuze, there is an understanding of assemblages, jam’, that they are in continuous flows and interruptions. New connections that create new assemblages are always possible once language stutters. The new jam’, al-Jāḥīz’s crazy boy created, is the creative new syntax in Deleuze. Epistemologically, jam’, and nazm are built on a rejection of identity, representation, objectivity, and the organic metaphor, and on an assumption of the constant instability of language and social life.

The creativity of nazm or syntax, therefore, is an attempt to reterritorialize an ambiguous, undefinable, constantly unstable, and unlimited meaning. Al-Gurgānī (1984) gives several examples of saying: Zayd is departing: Zayd munṭaliq, Zayd yarṭaliq, yarṭaliq Zayd, munṭaliq Zayd, Zayd al-munṭaliq, al-munṭaliq Zayd, Zayd huwa al-munṭaliq, Zayd huwa munṭaliq (p. 81). In all these alternative nazm, as well as in all sorts of “bringing a word forward or backward (taqdim wa ta’khir), making it definite or indefinite (ta’rif wa tankir) in all the speech, as well as in omission (ḥadḥf), repetition (ṭikār), or making it implicit (iḍmār) or explicit (iẓhār)” (p. 82) nazm changes according to meanings (p. 87).

**The Metaphor**

Both Deleuze and Arab grammarians seem to hold contradictory views on the metaphor. Deleuze rejects the metaphor and denies its existence, and so do several Arab medieval scholars, for instance, Ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328 CE/661–728 H) and Ibn Ḥazm (994–1064 CE/384–456 H). However, many Arab grammarians and linguists understand the significance of metaphor in a manner similar to Deleuze. An understanding of the assemblage in Deleuze, and jam’ in Arabic will explain the similarity in both Deleuze and Arabic grammar.

Deleuze’s hostility towards metaphors is well known, and it is rooted in his rejection of representative systems. Representation assumes a prior real identity, and its true, or metaphorical, representation. In addition, he denies an assumed hierarchy between mot propre, the proper word, and mot sales, the dirty metaphorical word (Lecercle, 2002, p. 26). There is neither a true meaning nor a metaphorical meaning. In place of these systems of representation, Deleuze gives primacy to difference, and their dynamic and constant connections into territorialized assemblages, which are immediately subjected to processes of deterritorialization. Deleuze conceptualizes this flow as “becoming”: “that all life is a plane of becoming, and that the perception of fixed beings—such as man—is an effect of becoming” (Colebrook, 2002, xx). What Deleuze proposes is a concept of metamorphosis, which is the contrary of metaphor. Metamorphosis is better understood in relationship to Deleuze’s concepts of state machine, and war machine.

The state machine is a machine of capture and territorialization. As such, it constitutes a field of interiority, external to which we find the war machine. War machines’ objectives have nothing to do with war; they are machines of creative mutation and change, that is, of deterritorialization. Metamorphosis are indeed war machines that produce flows of mutations and maintain the process of becoming. As we know, in Deleuze, there are no words separate from things. This is why Deleuze and Guattari (1986) praise Kafka, for “Kafka kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation” (p. 26). In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, they write:
There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following their line of escape. It is no longer a question of a resemblance between the comportment of an animal and that of a man; it is even less a question of a simple wordplay. There is no longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes the other, in a conjunction of flux, in a continuum of eversible intensities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 22).

The key to understanding this quote is Deleuze’s concept of becoming. Man and dog are not separate objective beings that are signified and represented by words, such as man and dog. They are only territorialized assemblages, actualized of differences, and the metamorphosis machine deterritorializes them. They are constantly in processes of becoming, “the becoming-dog of the man, and the becoming-man of the dog, the becoming-ape, or the becoming-beetle of the man and vice versa. We are no longer in the situation of an ordinary, rich language, where the word dog, for example, would directly designate and animal and would apply metaphorically to other things” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 22). Therefore, it is true that Deleuze rejects metaphors, but he does so because relationships among things are more serious and profound than can be reduced only to metaphors or resemblance. Humans, animals, trees, rivers, and rocks are assemblages made of assemblages, and they are all in a constant flow of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It is an understanding that does not fall far away from that of the fool of al-Jāḥiz, who saw noses, ears, legs, feet, and eyebrows in a flow that he could assemble as he wished.

That brings us to the contradictory positions toward the metaphor among Arab grammarians. A shallow understanding sees two opposing positions: those who defend the metaphor and its significance, and those who reject its very existence. On the one hand, Ibn Jinnī (1952) writes that “most of this language (Arabic) is understood metaphorically; it is very rare to use the true meaning” (vol. 3, p. 27). Al-Gurgānī (1984) takes this argument up one level by writing that “all reasonable people approve that the metaphor is always more eloquent than the truth” (p. 432). On the other hand, Abū Ishāq al-Isfrāyīnī (949–1027 CE/337–418 H) said: “There is no metaphor in the language of the Arab” (Al-Suyūṭī, 1986, vol. 1, p. 364). After al-Isfrāyīnī, all the Zāhirī scholars, as well as some Ḥanbalīs, especially Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350 CE/691–751 H) embraced and defended the position of rejecting the metaphor. Nonetheless, a close investigation of these positions will prove that they are not as divergent as some researchers have thought.

These two schools have a strong common ground in understanding language and meaning. First, except for the Mu’tazilah, all other scholars agree that eloquence—that is, articulating meaning—is rooted in excellence in nāzīm, not in any privilege a single word may carry (Al-Gurgānī, 1984, pp. 399, 458). Second, the meaning of utterance is known by observing the Arabs’ speech, that is, the use of language. Third, excessively esoteric or mystic interpretation cannot be recognized as šar’ī meaning. Let us, however, explore how each of these two schools understood the metaphor.

Al-Gurgānī (1984) wrote that “it is the consensus that metonymy is more eloquent than direct speech, what is implicit is better than what is explicit, that metaphor is favored, and allegory is always more eloquent than truth” (p. 70). Not all metaphors are equal, however, and the bar on which they are compared is of great significance. I will mention seven over-
lapping standards that al-Gurgānī used scattered in his books. First, the metaphor has to be useful; it should add something to the meaning, for it is meaning that we are after, not any shallow linguistic decorations. Just saying “man’s beak” or “bird’s lips” is not useful. The point of using the metaphor is to connect two beings, phenomena or statuses in meaning (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, pp. 26–36). Second, good metaphors are those that provide rich meanings with few words. The audience should be left wondering in the new world that has been connected to the described topic by only few words (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, p. 43). Third, creativity and newness are desired and appreciated. Finding similarities between the sun and a mirror, a shining sword and lightning, or a painted cloth and a flowered garden is not valuable. What is valuable is to find commonality in meaning between, say, the lightning and a reader’s mushaf, as s/he opens and closes it, or handwriting and branches with thorns (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, pp. 157–160). Fourth, a better metaphor is one that crosses kinds, types, and natural or rational classifications. Saying that Zayd is a lion is not as valuable as comparing violet flowers with fire. Zayd and the lion are, after all, living beings. The violet and fire are unrelated in kind, jins, so finding commonality in their meaning is more valuable (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, pp. 129–131). This point is important and is directly related to the next rule.

Fifth, if resemblance is obvious, the metaphor is ugly (Al-Gurgānī, 1984, pp. 450–451). Al-Gurgānī (1980) contrasts jumlah to tafsīl, that is, what is recognized as a whole to what is recognized through its details. Seeing the resemblance between the beautiful redness of the cheek and a red apple or rose is jumlah and has little value. He compares two verses, where the striking sword is metaphorically described as fire. In the first verse the sword is white as the inflaming fire. Al-Gurgānī does not like this one. The second verse, which he likes, compares the sword with the smokeless tip of a flame. The second verse is preferred because it connects the strike of the sword to only the tip of the flame that is not mixed with any smoke. A good metaphor, we can conclude, is one that deconstructs phenomena instead of comparing them as independent identities. The assemblage of fire in the second verse is deterritorialized, and a new assemblage is reterritorialized. That is perhaps what Deleuze meant by metamorphosis: a new assemblage that avoids shallow resemblance among identities (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, pp. 160–165). Before the assemblages of the sword and the fire, there are only differences and the virtual. The virtual image of the tip of the fire is a difference that was assembled twice: once in the fire and once in the striking sword. To use Deleuze’s language, the poet captured the becoming-sword of the fire, and the becoming-fire of the sword. The virtual is not an image of the real; it is primary and productive. Claire Colebrook (2002) explains that by writing:

Deleuze argued that the world is nothing other than an interactive plane of imaging or series of images, with each event in the world imaging or responding to every other. The world is not an already given whole of points or beings that then interact through perception and imaging; rather, a specific point is actualized only through the event of imaging and perception (pp. 68–69).

Sixth, a good metaphor requires some reflection, but too much reflection is a sign of a bad metaphor. The more delicate the metaphor, the better it is and the more reflection is required to reveal the connection in its meanings. Complicated, ambiguous metaphors that are intentionally made difficult to understand are bad metaphors, however. Al-Gurgānī (1980) writes that finding precious pearls requires diving, picking up the shells, and splitting them open. Diving to dangerous dark depths, and risking life in it, especially to come out eventually
with a bunch of beads is only terrible (pp. 139–148). The eloquent speaker, it seems, is one who reveals the fine connections among different assemblages, not the one who reflexively imposes these connections on them. Seventh, a good metaphor is one that assembles, yajma’, contradictory things. Al-Gurgānī (1980) explains this point in several parts of his books and considers it the highest position a metaphor can reach (pp. 143, 184). He praises metaphors where connection is created between two radically different phenomena, but their jam’ and tala’um, harmony, reaches perfection. He reveals that the secret of this excellence resides in ignoring ru’yab, appearance, and aiming toward rawyyah, thoughtful deliberation. It is by crossing the appearance of the phenomenon as a unit and by delving meditatively into its particles that the eloquent speaker can create the new metaphor as jam’. He writes that the speaker “does not look at things as they are recognized in space (taḥwībā al-āmnīnāh), but from where they are recognized by insightful hearts” (Al-Gurgānī, 1980, p. 150). Phenomena that look radically different as identities, we may conclude, are partially created out of common meanings. Al-Gurgānī (1980) warns against forcing different phenomena into connection. He writes:

Know that I am not telling you that whenever you brought together something with another that is different from it in kind, when they are considered as unitities, ‘ala al-jumlab, you did the right and good thing. My saying is limited and conditioned—that is to find between the two things that are different in kind and appearance true and reasonable resemblance, and to find harmony and correct gathering, ta’lif, between them, a way and a path, so that their harmonious gathering, i’rālaf, that instigated your metaphor out of thought and insight, ‘aql wa ḥads, is as clear as their difference in sight and sense, ‘ayn wa ḥiss.

... I did not mean to say that the skill in finding harmony among the different in kind is by creating resemblance that had no root in the mind. What I meant is that there are hidden resemblances that are difficult to be reached, so if your thought could pierce down and recognize them, then you deserve to be praised (pp. 151–152).

Jam’, therefore, is not a mere juxtaposition of differences. Nor is it a postmodern collage that aims to create new relationships among differences. Nor is it a modern integration of differences in rational structures. It is simply an assemblage, a Deleuzian assemblage.

In addition to the above seven factors, there is a crucial point on metaphors in al-Gurgānī’s writing that I need to explain before moving on to explore the second school that denies the metaphor altogether. Al-Gurgānī (1984) uses the expression “meanings of meanings,” or ma’ānī al-ma’ānī, in his explanation of the metaphor. He writes that, in speech, signifying meaning by meaning is better than signifying meaning by a word (p. 444). The best way to indicate the generosity of Zayd is not to say: Zayd is generous. The example al-Gurgānī (1984) uses is half a verse, where the poet describes himself as having a coward dog and an emaciated baby camel (p. 263). The meaning of the two words “coward dog” is known, but what is really signified here is a meaning of a meaning: my dog is a coward because I receive many guests. Again, my baby camel is emaciated because I already slaughtered the fatty ones for my guests. The gathering, jam’, of these meanings of meanings signify generosity. Repeatedly, al-Gurgānī (1984) emphasizes two points. It is not correct to claim that “a coward dog” and “an emaciated baby-camel” signify the same thing. They are not equal nor similar (p. 312). Second, there is no change in the meaning of word when it is used metaphorically (Al-Gurgānī,
1984, pp. 366, 367, 435, 437). If we say, for instance, Zayd’s claws, the word “claws” does not mean fingernails; it means claws, and signifies a meaning or several meanings of claws. If we reframe al-Gurgănî in Deleuzian terms, we will see that, for al-Gurgănî, generosity is not an identity. There is no ideal generosity out there, which is imperfectly represented in real generosity down here. The coward dog, and the emaciated baby-camels are not signs of generosity. It is the other way around: generosity is an assemblage created by many differences and particles that certainly form other phenomena. For instance, the coward dog can be a part of several assemblages: generosity, abuse, a canine pack hierarchy, a genetic attribute, and so on. This is why al-Gurgănî insists that these metaphors are not the same; in other words, they are not alternatives that signify the same thing: generosity. The classic metaphorical use of claws assumes that, in truth, they belong to the feline species, but we metaphorically change their meaning to indicate fingernails. By insisting that words do not change their names, al-Gurgănî, much like Deleuze and Kafka, points to indeed metamorphosis. We use claws because we signify meanings of claws, meanings that are shared in the assemblage of the cat, as well as in the assemblage of Zayd.

To further understand the above reflection, I will briefly visit Deleuze’s concepts of virtuality, actuality, differentiation, and differenciation. Deleuze (1994) writes that “Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by local integrations)” (p. 209). Starting by pure differentiation, Deleuze conceptualizes virtuality as formally structured by differentiation. Actualization comes as a second part of difference, as differenciation, where it is spatiotemporal. Actualization, however, is not, as we explained before, a mere incarnation of the virtual image. It is a genuine and creative process. The deterritorializing machine of metamorphosis, then, aims to cross the spatiotemporal barrier and delves into differentiated virtual differences that are, Deleuze argues, neither opposites nor negative. Is not this what al-Gurgănî (1980) meant above by ignoring “things as they are recognized in space, taḥwībā al-amkinah” and encouraging the speaker to see them “from where they are recognized by insightful hearts” (p. 150)? It is because both nazm and the metaphor/metamorphosis can both be understood as jam’ that al-Gurgănî states clearly that “all types of allegory are necessary for nazm: by allegory nazm happens, nazm becomes!” (Al-Gurgănî, 1984, p. 393).

The second school is the one that rejects the metaphor and does not accept it as a mode of speaking. Most prominent in this school are Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Taymiyah, so I will visit their works here, arguing that the dispute between these two schools is mainly in the naming of the metaphor, not its existence, working, or legitimacy. It is important to understand that the disputing argument of this school is in fact theological and not linguistic. Accepting statements on God—for instance, that he has hands, that he walks, or that he sits down—at face value runs the risk of anthropomorphism, but rationally arguing that these statements are mere metaphors will result in linguistic instability, where meaning is uncontrollable once it departs its social enunciation.

Ibn Ḥazm (1980) defines interpretation, ta’wil, as “moving the word away from its apparent meaning, and the meaning that was assigned to it in language to a different meaning” (vol. 1, p. 42). On allegory, he writes: “it is used in what was moved from its place in language to a different meaning” (Ibn Ḥazm, 1980, vol. 1, p. 48). Ibn Ḥazm (1980) prohibits the use of allegory to understand the meaning of speech that would otherwise be a lie. However, he
accepts allegory if it passes one of these four conditions. First, a word might not be inclusive in all its meaning. For instance, in Qurʿān, in Sūrah 2, Āyah 173, it says: “Those to whom the people said that the people have gathered against you”. “The people” there does not mean all the people in the world, even though that is the assigned meaning. Second, allegory is accepted when using a known word as a term to indicate a different meaning. For instance, zakāh means purity, but it was used by God to mean the obligatory alms. Third, it is also allowed in changing the predicate and counting on the understanding of the audience. For instance, in Qurʿān, in Sūrah 12, Āyah 82, it says: “Ask the city in which we were”. Obviously, it means ask the people of the city. The fourth case of an acceptable change in meaning is in abrogation. As an example of abrogation, there is the earlier instruction to Muslims to pray toward Jerusalem (vol. 3, pp. 135–136). In all these cases, there must be evidence that allows the change of meaning. This evidence can be either natural, ḥabīb, or legal, šarʿīyyah (Ibn Ḥazm, 1980, vol. 3, p. 137). Natural evidence is, for instance, asking the city and meaning asking the people of the city. Legal evidence would be, for example, using the word zakāh to indicate alms, not purity.

It is important here to note that al-Gurgānī also never argued for changing the meaning of the word, as I quoted him above. He insisted that the word used metaphorically keeps its meaning. The meaning in utterance is tied not to its words, but to these words’ Ṽazm. Ibn Taymiyah (2004) also makes this argument crystal clear: the single word has no independent meaning (vol. 20, pp. 412–413). Meaning is realized only in speech, not individual words. Returning to Ibn Ḥazm, who seems to argue of some original meaning, he too makes exceptions based on natural, that is, socially recognized, evidence. The ghosts in these writings, the ghosts that scare both al-Gurgānī and al-Ẓāhirīs, are interpretations that are too rational, and interpretations that are too esoteric. These are interpretations that aim to change the socially-known meaning and subject it to either Greek logic or subjective experience. Al-Gurgānī (1980) warns against ifrāṭ, using allegory too much, and thus creating esoteric readings or rational interpretations of divine attributes, and against tafrīṭ, using too little of it and creating a literal anthropomorphic reading (pp. 391–393). Ibn Taymiyah (2004) has the same statement: “this extremism in Ṽābir is of the same kind as that extremism of bāṬin” (vol. 13, p. 298).

It is important to highlight this consensus: the consensus between the two schools in rejecting both the too literal and the too interpretative readings, the former that finds meaning only in the single word, and the latter that finds meaning in individual subjectivities, the two readings that deviate from the jamiʿ of social enunciation. It is a common mistake in earlier scholarship to call these two schools literalist and interpretative. They do debate and dispute the metaphor, no doubt, but defining the nature of their dispute and the type of arguments they exchange does not lead us to characterize them as literalist or interpretative, if by literalist we mean driving meaning from the direct meaning of the single word, and by interpretative we refer to interpretations that are not rooted in the socially-recognized meaning of utterance.

Ibn Ḥazm’s school is called in Arabic Ṽābirī, from Ṽābir, which is the apparent as opposed to bāṭīn, which is esoteric and hidden. It is not called ḥarīfī, that is, literalist. Nevertheless, calling the Ṽābirīs literalist seems so far to have been rarely disputed in Western scholarship. Adam Sabra (2007) in “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism: A Critique of Legal Theory” correctly argues that rather than creating a conservative school in fiqh, the Ṽābirīsm of Ibn Ḥazm limits the
scope of Islamic law and the authority of Muslim jurists (pp. 7–40). However, he uses literalism as a translation of Żāhirīsm. Realizing the negative connotation of literalism, Sabra points out that “It would be incorrect, however, to characterize Ibn Ḥazm as a ‘fundamentalist’” (Sabra, 2007, pp. 22–23). It is Sherman Jackson, who insightfully analyzes Żāhirīsm as a legal school and proposes the accurate translation of ‘jurist empiricism’ as opposed to “jurist induction” (Jackson, 2006, pp. 1469–86). Jackson (2006) argues that “Carefully examined, Żāhirīsm reveals itself to have been neither an aberration nor unduly committed to literalism. It was merely a more entrenched (and perhaps consistent) commitment to the already established and increasingly hegemonic principle of juristic empiricism” (p. 1474). Where Żāhirīsm differed from other schools was in their rejection of analogy, but “this was not related to literalism but to its more emphatic and uncompromising commitment to juristic empiricism” (Jackson, 2006, p. 1475).

Robert Gleave (2012) in Islam and Literalism, correctly approves Yunis Ali’s argument that Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn al-Qayyim’s philosophy of language realizes meaning as “produced by use in context, not by an abstract linguistic system” (p. 147). However, he immediately, and incorrectly, argues that “For most Uṣūlis, though, the literal meaning was the default meaning because, unlike its rivals, it was not subject to (variable) context” (Gleave, 2012, p. 147). The “literal meaning” here, it seems, refers to deriving meaning off an abstract linguistic system. We find Jackson (2006), too, holding a similar opinion, for he argues against al-Ṣāfī ‘i, who supports the reliance on Arabs’ use of language in understanding the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth text, that the reaction to him by uṣūlis “was ultimately to reject his thesis in favor of an interpretative theory that was grounded in linguistic formalism, according to which meaning was restricted, mutatis mutandis, to the observable features of language (morphology, syntax, grammar)” (p. 1473). Though Jackson calls it interpretative, he, like Gleave, refers to an abstract linguistic system that provides the source for meaning. Different than Gleave and Jackson, who argue for the reliance on objective linguistic system known to scholars, Sabra (2007) argues for a żāhirī individualist attitude supported by an accessibility to language that is available to every believer (p. 21). What I find problematic in all these arguments is the mistaken insistence on deriving meaning from an assumed abstract linguistic system, for nothing, I argue, could be further from reality.

The argument that meaning, according to the uṣūlis, is derived from an abstract linguistic system will turn language from an assemblage, that is jam‘, into a rational structure. This argument, however, can easily be refuted for five reasons. First, asbāb al-nuṣūb, the direct reasons for the revelation of specific pieces of the Qur’ān, and asbāb al-wurūd, the direct reasons the Prophet spoke of certain reports of Ḥadīth, are essential to understanding the text. The text, in other words, has to be put back into its historical context to be understood. In addition, uṣūlis, among other scholars, divided the Qur’ānic text according to whether it was revealed in Mecca or Medina, and whether it was revealed in an urban or rural setting. The contingency of meaning on the historical context runs against an assumption of an independent text that provides its meaning through an abstract linguistic system. Second, there is the textual context. The understanding of meaning in a certain text is realized only through a process of jam‘ al-nuṣūs, or assembling it with other texts. The sentence or the larger piece of text has to be seen in its relationships with the text that precedes and follows it. Other relevant texts from the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth have to be gathered as well. All these texts come with a diversity of naẓm, histories, wording, and meanings. Contradictions are not uncommon, so methods of interpretative jam‘, ikbtyār or selection, and tarjīḥ or weighing, on the one hand,
or, on the other hand, ordering them chronologically to decide that a contradictory piece was simply abrogated are necessary to reveal the meaning. Third, even when the direct meaning is realized easily, the word order is typically controversial. For instance, even after avoiding words that each one of them has different meanings and words, whose meaning is unclear, and 

naẓīm that might be confusing, it is still an open question whether this text is khāṣ or ʿām, that is particular in its significance so it addresses typical cases, or general so it has a larger scope, and whether it is muqāyyad or muṭlaq, that is conditioned, so it cannot be used without certain conditions, or absolute, so it can be used universally. There is no abstract linguist system that might be helpful in answering these questions.

Fourth, there is al-Ṣāfiʿī’s argument, which Jackson dismissed quickly: the need to refer back to the real use of Arabic by native Arabs. This is the argument against which the uṣūlīs are said, according to Jackson, to build their discipline. I decided to quote Al-Muwafaqīt, for it was authored not according to the Ṣāfiʿī but to the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools of fiqh. In this book, al-Ṣāṭībi (2014) (D. 1388 CE/790 H) writes:

Among the assumptions is that it is necessary in the understanding of Sharīʿa to follow what was known to the unlettered people, and these are the Arabs in whose language the Qurʾān was revealed. If there was a continuous usage (ʿurf) in the language of the Arabs, it is not valid to deviate from such meaning in the understanding of the sharīʿa. If there was no such usage, it is not valid to apply meanings for its understanding that were not known to the Arabs. This applies to meanings, words and modes of expression. An example of this is that it was customary with the Arabs not to be subservient to the literal form of words in the preservation of meanings, even though this was observed as well. No single rule of the two was binding for them. They used to construct the meaning according to one at times and according to the other at other times. This did not affect the validity and soundness of their statements.

There are a number of evidences for this:

First: moving away, in many of their statements and speech, from the continuously applied norms, rules and regulations, and applying poetical forms in much of their prose, even though there was no special need, but giving up one form was for something better than it. This is not deemed deficient in their speech, nor a deteriorating factor; rather, it is extensive and strong, even though the other type of speech is more than this (vol. 2, pp. 62–63).

Two important points are highlighted here: meaning can be known only according to the use of unlettered Arabs, and deviation rather than stable rules is the character of spoken Arabic. In fact, al-Ṣāṭībi (2014) puts it again clearly and concisely as he writes that “reasoning within the sharīʿa to derive the rules is from the perspective that it is in the Arabic language, not that it is in speech alone” (vol. 2, p. 72). Thus, it is not only the speech, kalām, which may be examined independently and objectively using an assumed abstract linguist system, but it is the perspective of the unlettered Arabs, lisān al-ʿArab, that creates the ground for meaning. This is why—not without objections—kalām Allāh, the speech of God, has to be subjected to the authority of the spoken language as found in the jābilti, pre-Islamic Arab poetry (Al-Ṭayyār, 2011, pp. 154–172).

Fifth, as I quoted Ibn Jinnī above, in cases of conflict between the rules of grammar and meaning, it is grammar that has to yield to the priority of meaning. We find the same un-
derstanding in the two classic works on ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān, the methodological approaches to Qur’ān: Al-Burḥān of al-Zarkašī and Al-Īţqān of al-Suyūṭī. Al-Zarkašī (1957) reverses the relationship between meaning and grammar. He writes that the scholar should realize the meaning before finding the rules of grammar. The grammar of the letters that come in the beginning of some sūrah must not be sought after, for their meaning is unknown. Similarly, we should understand the ambiguous word kalālah, in sūrah 4, Āyah 12, before we know its i‘rāb, or grammar (vol. 1, pp. 204–206). Grammar that produces meanings other than the apparent one, assuming aberrance, ṣudḥiḍḥ, deviating from regular naẓm, aiming toward hidden possibilities of meaning or complicated metaphors must all be avoided (Al-Zarkašī, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 204–206). Were there a conflict between the apparent meaning and the apparent grammar, it is indeed the grammar that should be interpreted to reconcile with the apparent meaning, and not the other way around (vol. 1, p. 309). This same rule with several examples is repeated in al-Suyūṭī (2006): that in cases of conflict the priority is given to the meaning. He admits that there are two kinds of tafsīr or exegesis: tafsīr al-ma‘na, the exegesis of meaning, and tafsīr al-i‘rāb, the exegesis of grammar (vol. 4, p. 1235).

What we have, therefore, are not two contradictory schools, one interpretative, and the other literalist, but as Jackson has put it insightfully: juristic empiricism viz-à-viz juristic induction. Another accurate understanding of the Zāhibī school is introduced by Mordechai Cohen in his study on Maimonides’ biblical hermeneutics. Cohen (2011) found roots of the pesbat in the Andalusian Zāhibī school, and wrote:

Like other pashtanim, he was acutely aware of the disparity between talmudic law and the legal system that emerges from zāhib ar-naṣṣ—which he defines energetically in the third section of the Guide. Yet Maimonides invokes the rule of pesbat to devise an integrated legal hermeneutics, adapting concepts from Muslim jurisprudence to produce a stratified account of the “sources of the law” in a quest for legal scripturalism unique in the Rabbanite world (p. 487).

Cohen (2011) clearly explained that pashtanim did not lack any creativity in interpretation, and instead of calling it literalist he quoted Frank Kermode to indicate that it is rather the plain sense of the text (pp. 485–486). Ibn Ḥāẓm (1980), as I wrote above, accepts the use of allegory as long as there is evidence that it is allegorical speech, evidence that could be rational, textual or legal. The metaphor that he rejects, the one that he calls a lie, is the metaphor that changes the meaning that was intended by God. To make himself clear, Ibn Ḥāẓm used the example of wine if it were called metaphorically honey, a change in naming that would be followed by a change in its ḥukm so that drinking it becomes permissible (vol. 4, p. 30). Commenting on tašbih, simile, Ibn Ḥāẓm (1980) reveals an understanding that matches the Deleuzian understanding of the assemblage. Rejecting the use of simile-based rational analogy in deriving new rulings that are not explicitly mentioned in the text, he writes: “simile is the likening of one thing with another in some of their attributes. It does not create a ruling in religion at all. It is the foundation of analogy, and it is invalid, for everything in the world must be similar to each other from one or more aspects, and must be different from each other from one or more aspects” (vol. 1, p. 48 and vol. 4, p. 38). This accurate Andalusian medieval understanding of the Deleuzian assemblages as similarities among all phenomena is the zāhibī basis of rejecting analogy, for simile is not so exceptional that when it happens it becomes the basis of sharing the ruling, but it is in fact the norm.

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In this final section, I will explain that the philosophical foundations of the assemblage are to be sought in the Bergson's concept of the virtual, as interpreted by Deleuze in *Bergsonism*, and the concept of transversality, as Deleuze introduced it in *Proust and Signs*. In addition, I will explain how a number of theological assumptions in Islam match and support these Deleuzian concepts.

**Virtuality and Transversality:**

There are two aspects of the virtual that I need to highlight here: the virtual as a space of creation and production, and the virtual as the dimension of time. As a space of production, Deleuze contrasts the *possible* (as opposed to the real), to the *virtual* (as opposed to the actual). Instead of an ideal possible that is realized by resemblance, Deleuze proposes an active virtual that is already a part of reality. Rejecting the two forms of the negative—the negative of limitation, and the negative of opposition — Deleuze (1991) writes that the virtual “must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts” (p. 97). There is no possible after whose image reality is produced. The virtual is actualized by differentiation, and hence the primacy of difference. Deleuze (1991) argues that the possible — and so should be all binary structures — is produced retrospectively as an abstract of reality. He emphasizes that “life is production, creation of difference” (p. 98). The form that Deleuze proposes in his later works is the assemblage, which is indeed *jam‘*. This is why al-Strāfi, as I wrote above, argued that rules and laws can be known by induction not deduction. This is also why Ibn Hazm (1980) rejected the metaphor, by arguing, as I wrote above, that “everything in the world must be similar to each other from one or more aspects, and must be different from each other from one or more aspects” (vol. 1, p. 48 and vol. 4, p. 38). In other words, there are no true and separate images in whose likeness reality is produced. Clifford Geertz (1983) argues for a connection of identity between God and reality, as far as Muslim societies are concerned—a connection that reverses the is/ought problem. He writes that “Muslim adjudication is not a matter of joining an empirical situation to a jural principle; they come already joined. ... Facts are normative: it is no more possible for them to diverge from the good than for God to lie” (p. 189). The truth that Geertz conceptualizes here is not a preconceived truth, based on which reality is measured and judged. It is an active product of reality itself. This is the precondition of both the Deleuzian assemblage and the Arabic *jam‘*.

In *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze (2000) asks: “But just what is this form, and how are the orders of production or of truth, the machines, organized within each other?” (p. 161). He seeks a form where the parts remain partitioned and fragmented, but “without anything lacking; eternally partial parts, open boxes and sealed vessels, swept on by time without forming a whole or presupposing one, without lacking anything in this quartering, and denouncing in advance every organic unity we might seek to introduce into it” (Deleuze, 2000, p. 161). This is a form that excludes “the Logos both as logical unity and as organic totality” (p. 163). Deleuze (2000) is not denying a unity or a whole, but it is “a unity of this very multiplicity, a whole that is the whole of just these fragments” (p. 163). Deleuze’s answer to this question is the concept of transversality.

Deleuze (2000) defines this concept by writing that “It is transversality that assures the transmission of a ray, from one universe to another as different as astronomical worlds. The new linguistic convention, the formal structure of the work (of Proust) is therefore transver-
sality, which passes through the entire sentence, which proceeds from one sentence to another in the entire book” (p. 168). This understanding of transversality—as a communication among parts that does not exclude differences—had already been theorized by Guattari in his 1964 article “Transversality.” Guattari (2015) wrote that “Transversality is a dimension that tries to overcome both the impasse of pure verticality and that of mere horizontality: it tends to be achieved when there is maximum communication among different levels and, above all, in different meanings” (p. 113). What Deleuze adds to the concept is a dimension of time. The dimension of transversality, which connects and communicates parts without unifying them, “is a dimension in time without common measure with the dimensions they occupy in space” (Deleuze, 2000, p. 169). Time “has the strange power to affirm simultaneously fragments that do not constitute a whole in space, any more than they form a whole by succession within time. Time is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time” (Deleuze, 2000, p. 130). This notion sends us back to the second aspect of virtuality that I need to highlight: virtuality as a dimension of time.

In his interpretation of Bergson, Deleuze writes that we have the tendency of seeing differences in degree, that is, in terms of more or less, where there are differences in kind. This is why we mistakenly make time into a representation imbued with space, and thus, “we no longer know how to distinguish in that representation the two component elements which differ in kind, the two pure presences of duration and extensity” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 22). Through a series of arguments, Deleuze relates the virtual/actual duo to the philosophical duo of mind/matter. Mind, memory, duration, contraction, and the virtual are on one side, while matter, perception, expansion, and the actual are on the other side. These are duos that reflect differences in kind, and time is carefully reconceptualized not as a spatialized time made of a sequence of moments, but as a pure duration that belongs to virtuality. Deleuze (1991) writes that “The division occurs between (1) duration, which ‘tends’ for its part to take on or bear all the differences in kind (because it is endowed with the power of qualitatively varying with itself), and (2) space, which never presents anything but differences of degree (since it is quantitative homogeneity)” (p. 31). This is a bold argument, that there are no differences in kind except in duration. Assemblages, jam, we can conclude are different than structures in two main aspects: while structures are made of differences in degrees, and are anchored only in space, assemblages are made of both differences in degree and differences in kind, and are anchored in both space and duration, the actual and the virtual.

It is necessary at this juncture to understand the Deleuzian concept of time. The bold argument that Deleuze highlights in Bergson’s work is that recollection is not preserved in the brain. Recollection is preserved in duration, that is, recollection is preserved in itself (Deleuze, 1991, p. 54). Quickly, Deleuze puts matter, pure perception, and the present on one side, while putting on the other side memory, pure recollection, and the past. They seem to be the same two sides of the actual and the virtual. This allows Deleuze via Bergson to present a new conceptualization of the past. In contrast to the present, which is a pure becoming, its proper element is not being, but the active or the useful: the past “has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself. It should not be said that it ‘was’, since it is the in-itself of being ... of the present, we must say at every instant that it ‘was’, and of the past, that it ‘is’, eternally, for all time” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 55). This is a past that is contemporaneous with the present; the past and the present coexist with each other, not succeed each other. The pure past is always there, for it preserves itself in itself. This past in general is a whole,
through which all presents pass; it is like a cone, where different pasts exist at different levels. Each of these pasts includes the totality of the past “at a more or less expanded or contracted level” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 60). Contraction, in Bergson and Deleuze, is the movement toward the present, while expansion or dilation is the movement back into the past.

To tie together the two concepts of assemblage and jam’, we must now connect Deleuze and Bergson’s notion of the general past to a similar notion in Arabic and Islamic culture. It is here that we can, in fact we must, reconceptualize the concept of ghayb, for the relationship between jam’ and ghayb goes on the same lines as the relationship between assemblage and virtuality as it is anchored in the general past. Defining ghayb as absence is certainly wrong, but so is the compromising definition of it as the unseen. Defining ghayb and šahādah as the unseen and seen reality turns the difference between these two concepts into a difference in degree, as Deleuze and Bergson would put it. To reconceptualize the difference between ghayb and šahādah as a difference in kind is to define ghayb as virtuality, general past, pure being that is preserved in itself and coexisting with a sequence of fleeting contracted šahādah. Ghayb is a virtuality that coexists with a sequence of actualized šahādah. As a virtuality, ghayb is an active creativity. This activity matches the Qur’anic understanding of ghayb. For instance, in Sūrah 13, Āyah 39, the Qur’ān says: “God erases or confirms whatever He will, and the source of Scripture is with Him” (Abdelhaleem, 2008, p. 156). Destiny, as ghayb, is changing, and it is a meaning that we find in several reports of Ḥadīth. As an example, al-Nisābūrī (2002) narrated that the Prophet said, “al-balā, or bad destiny, comes down, so the prayer meets it up and struggles with it until the Day of Judgment” (vol. 1, p. 669). This is a dynamic concept of ghayb that is whole, being and ontology, but is yet pregnant with possibilities as it contracts into the present—that is actualized as šahādah.

Central in the definition of the past in general in Deleuze is its coexistence with the present. My interest here is in what Deleuze called an intersection of virtuality and actuality, for it mirrors an Islamic understanding of an intersection of ghayb and šahādah, not their separation. We see this in different places. For instance, Deleuze (1991), as he reflects on Bergson’s Matter and Memory, features five kinds of subjectivity: need subjectivity, brain subjectivity, affection subjectivity, recollection subjectivity, and contraction subjectivity. There, Deleuze (1991) argues that the first two subjectivities are distributed along the line of objectivity, while the last two belong to pure subjectivity, or virtuality. It is the third kind, affection subjectivity, that Deleuze claims to be impure since it “depends on the intersection of the two lines” (p. 53). In a different place, Deleuze (1991) writes:

> And however strictly the lines of actualization correspond to the levels or the virtual degrees of expansion (détente) or contraction, it should not be thought that the lines of actualization confine themselves to tracing these levels or degrees, to reproducing them by simple resemblance. For what coexisted in the virtual ceases to coexist in the actual and is distributed in lines or parts that cannot be summed up, each one retaining the whole, except from a certain perspective, from a certain point of view (p. 101). (Emphasis is mine.)

This overlapping of the virtual and the actual goes along the same lines as an overlap between ghayb and šahādah (Mohamed, 2018, pp. 25–43), one that was linguistically explained by Ibn Taymiah as he wrote on truth and metaphor. Ibn Taymiah argues that the relationship between, for instance, the two rivers, the ghayb river of Heaven and the šahādah river of Earth, is not a relationship between truth and metaphor. Neither of them is the true nor the
metaphoric river. Each of them is a fact. These two similar facts are similar from some perspectives, and this is why they share the same name. There is indeed an overlap between ghayb and šabādah in the language, an overlap that destabilizes language, and lies in the heart of the logic of jam’, an overlap that makes jam’ possible, yet distinct from the binary structures of logic.

**Conclusion**

In *The Fold*, Deleuze (1993) writes that “the multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways” (p. 3). Later, he writes that “the unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 6). I am afraid that I might have given a false impression that I am arguing for an Islamic and Arabic culture that is dominated by assemblages, where there is no space left for binary structures, Greek logic or systems of representation. That could not be further from the truth. Assemblages, as multiplicities, as jam’, are made of folds, within which binary and representative structures could be found. Those structures, however, and whether they are structures of, say, grammar, theology or law, are wrapped into the folds of the assemblage. Artificial grammar is wrapped in the folds of constructions grammar, Aš’arī theology in the folds of traditionalist theology, and rational law that is structured around mašlakah, or public interest, in the folds of law that is produced by tradition and scripture.

The present article has explored jam’ linguistically in two sites: naẓm and metaphor. If meaning could be accurately identifiable, word choice and artificial grammar would be enough to articulate it. The ambiguity of meaning, its subjectivity, and its rooting in virtuality limit its articulation to the assemblage of speech, its jam’, its naẓm. Each jam’—that is, each naẓm, for naẓm is jam’ in language—reveals the concealed meaning only partially, and differently. Not only the speaker, but language itself stutters. It trembles from its tensions, reflecting its inherent instability that is rooted in the impossibility of a final definition of meaning. This article sought jam’ in metaphor as well. If naẓm is the creation of an assemblage to articulate meaning, the metaphor approaches meaning by reversing this process, that is, by deterritorializing jam’ and finding commonalities among identities that were assumed to be true and distinct. The metaphor, or indeed the metamorphosis, explores the process of creating jam’ as becoming.

If the two sections on naẓm and metaphor described jam’ and explored its work linguistically, the last section of this article aimed to explain the theoretical foundation of jam’ and to understand it epistemologically. The foundation of jam’ is an understanding of truth and meaning as multiplicities that cross over both virtuality and actuality, so that it is jam’ not only of the different in degree, but also the different in kind, which only duration, the general past of virtuality, can accommodate. This article redefined Bergson’s and Deleuze’s general past as ghayb, which makes folds with šabādah.

The remaining question that this article has not answered is: what is the significance of jam’ anyway? Where can we find it in Islamic structures or dynamics outside language? What phenomena can this concept explain? These are the questions that will be answered in the second part of this article, which will provide an applied approach to jam’ that explores it in fiqh, theology, Ḥadīth, Sufism, as well as in the structure of the modern state, its economy, and the Islamist discourse of wasaṭiyah.
References


