ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВ РЕФОРМАТОРСКОГО ДВИЖЕНИЯ В МУСУЛЬМАНСКОМ МИРЕ: УСЛОВИЯ И ИСХОДНЫЕ ОСНОВАНИЯ

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Хотя мусульманскому миру исторически не были чужды реформаторские движения, в настоящее время ему не хватает динамики, связанного с обновленческим импульсом. Этот вопрос особенно важен после «арабской весны», которая относительно быстро закончилась или перетекла в насилиственное русло. В этой статье я намерен критически оценить следующие вопросы. Каковы условия возникновения реформаторских движений в исламском мире? В каких конкретных географических регионах такие движения более вероятны? Наследие реформаторов-джадидов Поволжско-Уральского региона и Центральной Азии (во второй половине XIX и в первых десятилетиях XX века) все еще живо среди широких слоев населения региона? Целью данной работы является очерщение контуров для изучения этих вопросов, состоящих как из теоретических рамок, так и из исходных статистических данных. Я предлагаю план того, что можно рассматривать в качестве условий для роста реформаторских движений, анализируя данные опросов на индивидуальном уровне из 6-й волны Обзора мировых ценностей. В этом исследовании я не претендую на то, чтобы объяснить рост или крах нынешних или исторических движений за реформы; моя цель состоит в том, чтобы проиллюстрировать предварительное и описательное исследование такого потенциала в районах с мусульманским большинством.

Ключевые слова: реформы в исламе, джадиды, обзор мировых ценностей.
While the Muslim world has historically been no stranger to reform movements, it is currently seen as lacking dynamism associated with the reformist momentum. This question is especially critical in the wake of the “Arab Spring”, which relatively quickly died out or turned into violent contestation. In relation to this important problem, in this paper, I purport to critically assess the following questions: What are the conditions for the rise of reform movements in the Islamic world? In what specific geographies such movements are more likely to appear? Is the legacy of the jadidi reformists of the Volga-Urals region and Central Asia (in the second half of the 19th and first decades of the 20th centuries) still alive among the general populace in the region? The purpose of this paper is to provide contours for the study of these questions, consisting of both theoretical frames and initial statistical data. After offering an outline for what can be considered as conditions for the rise of reform movements, I analyze individual-level survey data from the 6th wave of World Values Survey. While in this study I do not claim to explain the rise or fall of existing or historical reform movements, my objective is to provide an exploratory and descriptive investigation for such potential in the Muslim-majority areas.

**Keywords:** Reforms in Islam, Jadidi movement, World Values Survey.
**INTRODUCTION**

Muslim-majority states are often characterized by lower levels of democracy (Kuru 2014 p.399), greater degree of violence (Toft 2007; Karakaya 2015), and poorer record of women’s rights (Rorbæk 2015) in comparison with the rest of the world. While other factors, such as resource (e.g., oil) “curse”, and greater presence of younger populations are pointed out to explain at least in part those dynamics, many academics and popular opinion makers hold Islamic culture responsible for poor socioeconomic indicators. The extent to which Islam or Islamic culture are indeed responsible for these developments is subject to heated academic and policy debates. On one extreme one can find civilizationalist, or essentialist, approaches that view Islam and Islamic thought as inflexible at its core, on the other there are those who argue that contemporary liberal democratic thought could learn from Islam (Swaine 2018). These debates and the “objective” socioeconomic position of Muslim-majority areas have direct implications for the question of reform movements and “Islamic Reformation”. Many among those who think that Islam is the culprit for the current state of affairs in the Islamic world would tend to think that Islam is not “reformable”. Interestingly, this view is in line with the idea held by many on the opposite side who maintain that Islam needs no reforms whatsoever. As far as historical Islamic reformist movements are concerned, contemporary observers claim that reformers had failed to leave a truly transformative and lasting legacy. This failure is attributed to reformists’ inability to produce deep and compelling intellectual work that went beyond superficial imitation of Western ideas as well as to structural factors, including unenthused masses in Muslim-majority areas who were not interested in reformist messages preferring conservative traditionalists instead (Kuru 2018).

The focus of this article, however, is on the possibility of reform or renovationist movements in the Islamic world. In the rest of this paper, I proceed as follows. First, I briefly talk about the history of most recent historical reform endeavors in the Muslim world. Posing specific research questions, I then introduce three conditions responsible for the rise of reform movements — education, value system, and religiosity — which I develop drawing on both theoretical and historical work. Utilizing survey research data, next I evaluate empirically my theoretical propositions. I conclude by discussing the results and their limitations and implications.

**Reform Movements: Past and Prospects for the Future**

The late 19th-early 20th centuries witnessed the rise (and fall) of reform movements in the Islamic world. Among those spearheading an “Islamic modernist” movement in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia were Jamal al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Qasim Amin (1865-1908) (Almazova 2015 p.260). Among more recent proponents of Islamic reformation whose academic work is respected in the West is Fazlur Rahman (Rahman 1970; Rahman 1982). While reformist movements existed in the “conventional” Muslim areas of the Ottoman, Persian and British domains, among some of the most interesting but less explored and known reformist movements are the *jadidi* movement, appeared in what is now known as the post-communist Middle Volga, Siberia, Crimea, and Turkestan/Central Asia. While the topic of *jadidi* reformation is still very much a “work in progress”, it is clear that Jadidism was a complex phenomenon. For example, there is a traceable distinction between Volga-Uralian and Central Asian *jadidisns* as implied by some historians (Baldauf 2001; Tuna 2017). Even within the Tatar *jadidism* of the Volga-Urals one can find
divergent trends. On one level, it was connected to the problems of the general ummah, however on another it can be seen as a response to the more immediate and local challenges of de-Tatarization and the loss of Tatar ways of life (Almazova 2015). The recent resurgence in the interest in the jadidi movement is linked in no small way to the precious little that is known about it. For that reason, it is often overlooked that Jadidism was not homogenous but rather a movement that consisted of a number of different intellectual streams which were not necessarily seeing eye-to-eye on every issue. For example, there were modernists who thought that Islam should be brought in accordance with modernization as experienced in the West. Many among them would adopt the notion of intelligentsia from the Russian and Polish contexts (Tuna 2017). Others, as did Bigiev, thought that it was not Islam that needed reform but “our thinking about it”. A common denominator that united those strands was the need for action that would bring about cultural and religious reform. Decades of the Bolshevik rule suppressed Jadidism, however many question whether reform movements can still emerge in the Islamic world today. If so, where those movements are most likely to occur? What are some of the conditions that would enable the rise of Islamic reform movements? Prediction may not be seen as a proper function of political science. However, to the extent prediction is said to be one of the two sides of the same coin, with explanation being the other side, it certainly is. Explanation brings to the surface and fleshes out problems and factors inherent in the explicandum (the puzzle/question/issue to be explained). As such, an event can be predicted only because of our knowledge of how this event is linked to other events. After all, to be able to explain an event also implies one’s ability to predict that event, since one offers an outline of the conditions responsible for the occurrence of such event (Ake 1972 p.109).

A number of structural factors that can be provided that either enable or hinder development of reform movements. Such factors, including the economy, demographic variables, and democracy, interweave into an opportunity structure facilitating such movements. On the other hand, there are more immediate resources, at the level of individuals and groups, that are more readily available to specific persons or groups of people; such factors are likely to have more proximate effects on individual agency enabling groups and individuals to organize as reform movements. Focusing on the level of agency, I examine three factors seen among the most effective in reform movement formation — education, value system, and religiosity.

**Education**

Even though Central Asian jadidism, in the view of Ingeborg Baldauf was composed of individuals who “came from very different socio-economic and educational backgrounds” (Baldauf 2001 p.72), the general designation of “Jadid” was used to loosely refer to any Muslim “with a modern education” who actively took part in public life in imperial Russia (Khalid 2007 p.4). These individuals were a part of the “efforts to reform Muslim society through the use of modern means of communication…and new forms of sociability” (Khalid 1993 p.137, cited in Baldauf 2001). Being foremost an intellectual movement jadidis saw value in cultural and religious reform, in which education and enlightenment was key.

In general, there is much theoretical evidence that better educated individuals and collectivities exhibit characteristics valuable in modern developed societies. Many theorists agree that education fosters the ‘culture of democracy’ and commitment to civil liberties among various political actors (Lipset 1959; Stouffer 1959; Kohn 1969; Nunn Z. et al. 1978; Hyman
and Wright 1979; McCloskey and Brill 1983). Education also broadens human horizons and “enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance” (Lipset 1959 p.79; Lipset 1981 p.39). Moreover, education provides individuals with the skills to make rational choices; it also “restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines (Lipset 1959 p.79; Lipset 1981 p.39). Consequently, people with a higher degree of schooling are inclined to be tolerant of others’ actions (Hall et al. 1986 p.565) and less supportive of violent protests (Hall et al. 1986).

Additionally, education increases one’s knowledge about the underlying issues related to political action. Education not only introduces people to information, but also lays ground for a continuing quest for knowledge through reading and attending to mass media (Hyman et al. 1975). Education thus enhances the benefits of nonviolent social participation as it is conducive to an unflawed exchange of information (Helliwell and Putnam 2007). Thus, educated people possess better developed skills of communication, persuasion and expression of their knowledge as their ability to acquire new information, understanding and learning is also superior. In this sense, education inculcates the rules of behavior that renders communication between educated people more fruitful, informative and less violent (Bowles and Gintis 1976).

Further, education produces distinct interests and identifications. It leads to the formation of a stratum within the society that has separate norms, values, life styles and interests. Even though in some instances such identities and interests may only weakly be connected with nonviolent movements, in many others this effect strongly informs the relationship between education and peaceful political action (Hall et al. 1986). It is true, as pointed out by Adeeib Khalid, that jadids have been countered ferociously by many strata within their societies (Khalid 2007 p.5) and have constituted only a minority within the general population, being largely confined “to urban Muslim societies of the Volga-Urals region, Crimea, Siberia, and Turkestan” (Khalid 2007 p.4). However, the scope of their intellectual ambitions was grandiose as they sought to transform the very fabric of cultural and religious life of their home societies. The means of their impact included establishment of “schools or newspapers, presentation of “plays in theaters” and debates “with other Muslims over the permissibility and the necessity of thorough-going reform” — as such, they were a part of the Islamic discourse (Khalid 2007 p.4), and likely a significant one.

Skills associated with educated groups, including discipline and organization, are key elements responsible for the success of one’s social actions and political endeavors. To ensure the success of their functions and be able to coordinate their efforts, group members should develop capability to explain and understand various tasks, the methods of their accomplishment, and the motivation behind their action. Educated groups are better equipped with skills and abilities to coordinate their actions than less educated collectivities, being more likely to launch and maintain a nonviolent movement.

In contrast, a less sophisticated individual is likely to hold “a simplified view of politics, to fail to understand the rationale underlying tolerance of those with whom he disagrees…” (Lipset 1981 p.108). In a familial context, increased amounts of domestic violence against spouses and children are observed among families with lower education and socioeconomic status (Erlanger 1975).

In fact, “[e]ducation is one of the most important predictors — usually, in fact, the most important predictor — of many forms of [peaceful] political and social engagement…” (Helliwell and Putnam 2007 p.1). As the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mairead Maguire
observes, “The old adage ‘education is easy carried’ is so true. It gives one a sense of dignity, of feeling in control of one’s own life. Lack of education can lead to frustration, anger, violence, a sense of alienation and a society storing up problems for the future...” (Maguire 2010, italics in original).

As such, my theoretical expectation is that the better educated collectivities will tend to facilitate reformist movements in their social and political pursuits. Education is likely to cultivate the values of tolerance, decrease the costs of social interaction and establish distinct strata leading to religious movements which favor a rational, modernized, and nonviolent approach to politics and religion. Conversely, groups with lower educational attainments are likely to lack such skills frustrating any efforts at religious reformation.

The following is the first proposition that I offer for an empirical evaluation:

**Proposition 1:** Education positively influences the possibility of a religious reform movement formation.

**NORMS, VALUE SYSTEMS, AND IDEAS**

Even though education is deemed important, its role in the formation of modern, “civilized” ethnoreligious movements has recently been subjected to increased scrutiny and alternative interpretations by academic scholarship. For example, in a critical evaluation of my 2011 “Education for Peace: Protest Strategies of Ethnic Resistance Movements” (Shaykhutdinov 2011) article, Erica Chenoweth argues that “a lot of the most dangerous terrorists or insurgents in the world have been educated elites — including many suicide terrorists” (Chenoweth 2011). The perpetrators of 9/11 attacks fall into this category. It may also be the case of an ecological fallacy, when generally high levels of education aggregated at the level of ethnic and religious groups do not correspond one-to-one to individual characteristic of specific single persons belonging to that group. It has also been found (in the case of Kenyan schoolgirls receiving merit scholarships) that while education empowers disadvantaged groups by reducing their levels of acceptance of political authority and domestic violence and enhancing their objective political knowledge; increased education is associated with greater legitimacy of political violence alongside their apathy for a more institutionalized community involvement or voting participation (Friedman et al. 2011; Friedman et al. 2016).

As such, an important newer scholarship provides fresh insights regarding the effects (or non-effects) of education on the nature of social and political behavior, qualifying and shifting the relationship between education and peace form positive to negative effect. Yet, I would not discount the positive influences of education immediately. Instead, recent insights provide an opportunity to think about the connection between education and political behavior in more than simply linear terms. Consequently, the effects of education may well be multiplicative, or conditional on other factors. Among the most important factors are those of norms, values, and ideas cultivated through education and socialization. In fact, values held by an individual *a priori* may influence his/her choice of the type of education. Values acquired early may critically inform an individual’s absorbance and internalization of any subsequent schooling regardless of its type, level, and quality. In the contemporary context, the type of education that emphasizes “the pursuit of knowledge and intellectual growth, temporarily free from the material demands of life [...] one that] values breadth of knowledge over narrow specialization and holds an appreciation of learning for its own sake rather than for utilitarian ends” is liberal arts learning. Liberal learning holds in high esteem
“breadth of knowledge over narrow specialization and holds an appreciation of learning for
its own sake rather than for utilitarian ends” (Goyette and Mullen 2006 p.498). As such,
instruction in liberal arts is deemed to develop students’ character and cultivate attributes
such as judgment, awareness of one’s responsibility toward society, and reason. Historically,
the aim of liberal arts training was to provide elite students qualities necessary for the
government–related positions (Goyette and Mullen 2006 p.498).

This type of education is likely to resonate with reform-minded individuals. Much of the
Christian Reformation, for example, was linked to the rejection of the excesses of utilitarianism,
corruption and was aimed at reclaiming the lost spirituality. The Reformation was in large part
an intellectual movement that was informed by a set of norms and ethics, as exhibited in Luther’s
work widely known as “The Ninety-Five Theses”. One should be sensitive enough in pointing
out that Christianity was far from homogenous or hierarchical at the time of the Reformation;
moreover, indulgences did not directly suggest that the Church’s was inherently corrupt (Appold
2011). Yet, Appold shows vividly the dichotomy of two very interpretations concerning the sale
of indulgences: If to a theologian like Luther the for-profit sales of indulgences were an immoral
theological offense, to a historian of economics this act was simply a reflection of the changing
and largely benevolent norms of a new era of commercial and bourgeois enterprise. Spiritually
and ideationally, however, the end result was that “The ascetic ideals of the early monks and
first mendicants, so often a corrective to such behaviors, had all but vanished from the church’s
public face” (Appold 2011 p.47). The Reformation was, therefore, a sort of rebellion against the
economic values of the newly developing materialism. It is a stretch to call Luther’s values post-
material at least due to a drastically different historical context; one, however, can argue that
both Luther’s Reformation and libertarian post-materialism of the modern post-World War 2
era see great significance in non-material values.

One should similarly be cautious in applying the jadidist traditions to the present-day
environment. As Khalid (Khalid 2007) warns, the current context is drastically different from
the one of the early 20th century in a number of respects. Moreover, jadidism now means
different things for different nations living in distinct geographical areas. If jadidism was
almost nonexistent among Kazakhs and the Turkmen, it has recently been reconstructed to
legitimize the creation of an independent Uzbekistan and the Uzbek nation. Similarly, in
the Volga-Urals, according to Khalid, jadidism is largely associated with Tatar nationalism,
whereas among Tajiks it represents a hostile pan-Turkic (largely Uzbek and anti-Tajik)
the other. Nevertheless, this admittedly heterogeneous movement sought to address and
resolve what it saw as the problems of its time through a mechanism of cultural and religious
reform. Similar to the Christian Reformation, one can point out a dichotomy of allegedly
corrupt and increasingly aloof qadimçelâr (qadimches, kadimists), on the one hand, and,
Jadids calling for the alteration in the old ways of life, on the other. Methods and logic offered
by the still little known, but vigorously (re)discovered, jadid Musa Bigiyev is very instructive
of the theological dimension of the Jadid movement. Bigiyev, in the worlds of Görmez, was
critical of the scholars of kalam who largely employed Aristotelian logic of debate. In Bigiyev’s
interpretation, the Aristotelean logic was used by kalamists largely with the purpose of winning
the debate, as opposed to uncovering the Truth. As such, Bigiyev viewed their methods,
including Aristotelean logic and qiyas (analogy), unproductive. Empirically unverifiable
argumentation produced by such theologians was also of futile to him (Gërmez [Görmez]
2010 pp.74–79). Both the original Luther of the Protestant Reformation and “the Luther of
Islam”, as Bigiyev is often dubbed, are likely to believe that ideas should count more than
money and that human beings should be given their proper value. One, therefore, can expect that religious reformism will emerge among those who think that ideas and humanitarian considerations are more important than economic enrichment or personal physical security.

**Proposition 2:** Proponents of religious reformism are likely to view the value of ideas and humanitarian issues as more significant than economic wellbeing or physical safety.

**Religiosity**

It is important to keep in mind that reform movements are, in essence, religious movements of cultural reformation. As Khalid maintains, these movement “appropriated many aspects of other discourses, but ultimately they were part of an Islamic discourse” (Khalid 2007 p.4). The Jadids would have defined themselves as “those who participated in debates about the reform on Muslim cultural life, who established schools or newspapers, presented plays in the theater, and argued with other Muslims over permissibility and the necessity of thorough-going reform” (2007 p.4, italics in original). Of course, some Jadids may be more involved in theological debates than others. Musa Bigiyev, mentioned above, is a case in point. He was a major figure in the Muslim renaissance of 1905, having put together records of the All-Russian Muslim Congresses and participating in the early phases of the Tatar national movement. He was noted in 1909 for what others dubbed as “the errors in the Qur’an” that he had identified. In reality, however, he did not talk about the errors in the Qur’an, but instead about errors of people who read it as in the way the Qur’an was currently written there are “more than 60 places” where interpretation of the Arabic has been challenging. The version of the Qur’an that he had corrected received a far-reaching acceptance among the ulema in the Muslim world. This was his first major “victory” in what was seen by some as the reformation in Islam. He subsequently produced books where he utilized his revised version for re-reading and re-interpreting earlier Islamic scholars (Goble 2018; Xäyretdinov (Khairutdinov) 2018). Consequently, those who are currently may support Islamic reformism should also exhibit higher levels of religiosity. Consequently, I also account for religiosity of the contemporary respondents.

**Proposition 3:** Proponents of religious reformism will tend to view religion as an important part of their life and worldview.

It is also likely that the “most” reformist individuals will exhibit a combination of these factors.

**Proposition 4:** Proponents of religious reformism will tend to have higher levels of educational attainment, exhibit non-material or post-material values, and view religion as an important part of their life and worldview.

**Data and Variables**

**Data**

I draw my data from the World Values Survey (2010–2014) (WVS) sixth wave data (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) (Inglehart et al. 2014). It is important to note that cultural studies literature has criticized applications of the World Values Survey to non-Western contexts. Swedish political scientist Åsa Lundgren (2015), for example, argues that the World Values Survey reproduces ethno-centric conclusions when applied to the Arab/Muslim world. I would like to see a better instrument developed to capture and address the
main questions of my study. Nevertheless, the conclusions derived from the World Values
Survey application exclusively to the Muslim world, without its explicit comparison to other
regions, may still yield valuable insights.

The countries/areas included in the analysis are Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Palestine,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. This list is consistent with and largely similar to
the sets of Muslim-majority states used in recent statistical analyses (Kuru 2014; Achilov
and Shaykhutdinov 2018). Due to importance of the ancestors of the present-day Volga and
Crimean Tatars in the formation of the Jadid movement I also include Tatars as a separate
item into the sample, in addition to the countries listed above. Individuals included in the
Tatar category are those who (a) speak the Tatar language at home (V247: Language at home),
even though they may not identify as Tatar (V254: Ethnic group), (b) identify as ethnic Tatar
but do not speak Tatar at home, and those (the largest category) who (c) are Tatar-speaking
ethnic Tatars. Individual-level surveys are aggregated at the level of country for each of
the independent Muslim-majority states and the Tatar group. For number of individual surveys
(n) for countries varies from a minimal value of 1000 (Yemen) to a maximal 2131 (Libya). The
number of observations for the Tatar category is the lowest (n=109). The sample for the Tatar
category is drawn from the following countries: Belarus (1), Kazakhstan (33), Kyrgyzstan (5),
Romania (1), Russia (44), Ukraine (7), and Uzbekistan (18).

Since the number of observations for this group is 9.17 to 19.55 times lower than for any
other category in the sample, statistical confidence for Tatar-related estimates is lower in
comparison to other groups. The total number of surveys in the sample is 24,334.

Variables

Education: A key variable likely to be associated with support for Islamic reformism is
education. I capture this variable using WVS’s “Highest educational level attained” (V248)
score. I specifically isolate those in the sample who received a university-level degree
(originally scored as “9. — University — level education, with degree”).

Values: To measure the nature of value systems held by the respondent I employ WVS’s
question V64, which prompts the respondent to select the most important item as their first
choice (“Most important: first choice”) from among four substantive options of “1. — A stable
economy; 2. — Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society; 3. — Progress
toward a society in which Ideas count more than money; [and] 4. — The fight against crime”.
Respondents who select items 2 and 3 are coded as holding non-material or post-material values.

Religiosity: Scores “1” (very important) and “2” (rather important) in variable V9
(“Important in life: Religion”) are utilized to designate those individuals in whose lives
religion plays an important role.

1. Kuwait is included in the analyses whenever the data are available.
2. Total n=25,637 in the analyses that include Kuwaiti respondents.
3. The full list of responses is “1. — No formal education; 2. — Incomplete primary school; 3. — Complete primary school;
type; 6. — Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type; 7. — Complete secondary school: university-
   preparatory type; 8. — Some university-level education, without degree; 9. — University — level education, with
degree; -5. — ALL: Inapplicable (No-school education) DE, SE: Inapplicable ; SG: Refused; ZA: Other; Missing; -4. — Not
   asked; -3. — Not applicable; -2. — No answer; -1. — Don’t know.”
4. Other (non-substantive) options are “-5. — HT: Dropped out survey, RU: Inappropriate response; -4. — Not asked in
   survey; -3. — Not applicable; -2. — No answer; -1. — Don’t know.”
5. Other options are “3. — Not very important; 4. — Not at all important; -5. — BH, HT: Missing; RU: Inappropriate response;
   -4. — Not asked in survey; -3. — Not applicable; -2. — No answer; -1. — Don’t know.”
**Results**

Figures 1-3 demonstrate the relative rankings of the countries/groups under investigation in regard to (1) educational attainment, (2) non-material/post-material values, and (3) religiosity, respectively. Interestingly, although not surprisingly, the post-Soviet Azerbaian, Tatar, Kazakhstani, and Kyrgyzstani populations occupy the very top ranking positions with respect to the proportion of individuals with higher education. Uzbekistan defies this pattern somewhat, but still occupies an 11th position just below the median line (Fig. 1). Kuwaitis, Libyans, Palestinians, Lebanese, Egyptians, and Turks are also above the median, while Southeast Asians (Malaysia and Pakistan), Sub-Saharan Africans (Nigeria), most North African countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), as well as Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq are in the lower half on the higher education scale.

As far as adherence to non-material or post-material values is concerned, post-communist Kazakhstani, Tatars, and Kyrgyzstani are on the bottom of the list second only to Egyptians, Yemenis, and Tunisians (Fig. 2). Uzbekistan fares a little better (11th), as do Jordan (13th) and Morocco (12th), but all three are still in the lower half of the ranking. With Nigeria in the middle, the upper half is occupied by Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijani, Algeria, Libya, Palestine, and Malaysia. Thus, among the former Soviet citizens only the citizens of Azerbaijan show the highest rate of non-material/post-material values and even then, only after four other states.

To most residents of all Muslim-majority areas, religion is important in life (Fig. 3). More than 92% of residents in 14 (out of a total of 20) areas/groups think that religion is important for them. In Jordan and Egypt, almost 100% of respondent think so (99.6 in Jordan and 99.74% in Egypt), whereas in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Morocco this figure ranges between 98.2% and 98.75%. For the residents of the ex-communist states this figure is significantly lower: 55.07% in Kazakhstan, 66.81% among Tatars, 68.96% in Azerbaijan, 73% in Uzbekistan, and 84.87% in Kyrgyzstan. The only group in the sample whose
Religiosity is below 90% and who, therefore, are comparable to the ex-communist peoples on that statistic are Lebanese (77%) (Fig. 3).

None of the groups analyzed in this sample rank consistently high or consistently low on all three indicators. Even though Libya and Uzbekistan are the only countries that are in the top and low halves of all three factors, respectively, Uzbekistan is close to borderline on
two factor, whereas Libya is clearly within the bounds of a top quarter only on one factor. This suggests that the overlap between the three factors — education, non-material values, and religiosity — is low as is perhaps the likelihood of a mass reformist movement formation among Muslim populations, based on these factors. Yet, what are the exact proportions of the populations who embrace all three dimensions deemed important for the emergence of reform movements? To answer that question, I now turn to Figure 4, which presents percentages across the areas/groups under consideration of (a) university graduates who hold (b) non-material or post-material values and for whom (c) religious is important.

As evident from the figure, the ratios of the population where all three factors intersect are indeed relatively low but not insignificant in the Muslim world, ranging from 0.92% in Malaysia to 7.09% in Azerbaijan. Interestingly, post-communist Muslim groups are spread out on this three-dimensional parameter, with Kyrgyzstanis and Tatars occupying the upper half (alongside Azerbaijanis), while the citizens of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in the lower half, though not far behind Tatars. Among those outside the post-communist region, Libyans, Palestinians, Lebanese, Algerians, and the Turkish are in the upper half; most Africans, both North and Sub-Saharan (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Nigeria), and Southeast Asians (Malaysia and Pakistan) are in the lower half.

Discussion and Conclusions

These results provide interesting, even though by no means conclusive, findings concerning potential rise of reformist movements among Muslim-majority groups. The three factors suggested in this paper, both conceptually and empirically are unlikely to go hand-in-hand. Yet, it was my argument that such an unlikely confluence of education, non-/post-material values, and religiosity, is the necessary, though not sufficient, mix that will produce the reformist thinking. The initial findings seem to both support and challenge this argumentation. That Azerbaijanis are on the top does not seem to be surprising,
however Tatars’ (3.67%) and Uzbeks’ (2.47%) mediocre midlevel position is surprising given their history of involvement with the Jadidist movement. Similarly, the less than successful experience of Egypt in the Arab Spring is line with the empirical finding that Egypt is second from the bottom in terms of the “reformist” population (0.98%) and close to the war-torn Yemen (1.10%). Yet, perhaps the most successful case of the Arab Spring, Tunisia (1.24%), defies my expectations by being in the lower half, whereas a warring Libya is the top second (6.15%), right behind Azerbaijan.

Perhaps the most immediate response to the mixed results is that the model, while generally elegant and parsimonious, does not include all relevant factors. Among additional candidates for inclusion is individuals’ experience of participation in social movements, networks, and organizations. Adopting a measure from WVS on the total number of hours of activity in voluntary organizations, I address this issue. I specifically use variable MN_35A (“Approximately how many total hours a month were you active in voluntary organizations”)6. If the respondent indicates that s/he volunteered at least 1-2 hours per month, I consider him/her to be actively involved in a voluntary organization. I present the results for the six cases where the data are available in Figure 5.

Adding the factor of active participation in volunteer organizations further qualifies the previous rankings, with Lebanese (2.08%) and Tatars (1.83%) leading the chart of “reform-minded” individuals in society, followed by Algerians (1%) and Yemenis (0.80%) whose statistics halve those of the top groups, and Iraqis (0.58%) and Tunisians (0.33%) in the end.

While inclusion of participation in social organizations brings Lebanese and Tatars on the top of reform-minded groups, it is, nevertheless, important to keep in mind the changing sociopolitical context in which these and other groups find themselves. As Almazova points out, "...by the time that the Volga-Ural region returned once again to the arena of

6. Possible responses are "0. — None; 1. — 1-2 Hours; 2. — 3-5 Hours; 3. — 5-10 Hours; 4. — More than 10 Hours a month; -5. — Missing value; -4. — Not asked; -3. — Not applicable; -2. — No answer; -1. — Don’t know".
ideological debates in the Islamic Ummah, the map of Islamic ideologies had become entirely different" (Almazova 2015 p.263). Thus, further factors, such as decades under closed political and economic regimes, may effect both the very possibility and configuration of an emergent reformist movement. Decades of the communist rule diametrically shifted the nature of concerns for many peoples in the post-communist geographies. If for the Jadids of the early 20th century the main issue was to alter or uproot the tradition, the pressing concerns in the immediate aftermath of communism was that of preserving tradition (Khalid 2007 p.6). Moreover, replacement of porous imperial borders with those of the centralizing nation-states states qualitatively and numerically increased the number of borders and lowered their permeability. This dynamic would render cross-spatial communication for reform movements difficult.

Contemporary jadids will also have to struggle in finding new roles and responding to modern challenges. For example, in the Soviet period Jadids were revered as enlighteners and, in the case of Uzbekistan, as fathers of Uzbek literary tradition. They have also been much celebrated during perestroika. However, at present, political authorities of nation-states grow concerned about the influence of “political Islam”. As such, the Islamic legacy of jadids in Central Asia and beyond puts them in a contradictory and “awkward” position. On the one hand, they are celebrated as the heroes, servants, and martyr for the national (as in Uzbekistan) awakening and nation-building. Yet, on the other hand, their Islamic attributes in the age of Islam’s securitization makes it all but impossible for the authorities to fully rehabilitate jadids’ legacy. Of course, such concerns might be misplaced — if for the present-day political Islamists the goal is to “Islamize the modern world”, Jadids’ pursuit was “to modernize Islam” — leaving little similarity between the historical Jadids and today’s radicals (Khalid 2007 p.6). Nevertheless, the difference in spatial and temporal contexts will place heavy burdens on the shoulders of the would-be Islamic reformers nowadays.

In addition to the question of context, there are more immediate limitations to the empirical projections offered in this study. One of them deals with the survey instrument on which I had to rely. It would have been ideal to tackle the question of Islamic reformation head-on and ask respondents directly whether they think that reform in Islam is necessary and whether they approve of it. Due to logistical limitations, I had to rely on WVS’s proxy instruments to address my questions.

Second, there is an issue of conceptual complexity of the notion of Islamic reform; at the empirical and practical level, the problem is how to translate in an accurate but uncluttered manner “Islamic reformation” into survey instruments. Recent scholarship conceptualizes Jadidism as a heterogeneous movement, which included those who wanted to modernize every aspect of Islam making compatible with Western modernity as well as those who were very much opposed to it. Increasingly, scholars also argue that the conventional distinction between traditionalist qadimis and reformist-minded jadidis was not as sharp as many would think. Overall, therefore, at the conceptual level it is possible to think about multiple paths of Islamic reform, rather than a single set of reformationist policies.

Third and related to the problem of different contexts, renovationist movements in Islam may also be conflated with puritanist salaf movements in the mind of the general public as well as political and religious elites. This is illustrated colorfully by the chairman of the Ulema Council of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Republic of Tatarstan. In late 2011 he claimed that Jadid modernism set into motion pervasive atheism, that jadids are
not dissimilar from the Wahhabis who, in turn, are like the godless people. While both Islamic puritans and jadids represent renovationist movements, the distinction between them is clear (Almazova 2015).

Fourth, concerns pertaining to the general survey research similarly apply to this study. For example, respondents may tend to answer survey questions in ways, which are socially desirable in their cultural milieus. In other words, empirical results obtained from survey research may either overestimate or underestimate respondents’ true preferences for Islamic reformism.

Fifth, it has been argued that socio-political attitudes, including those measured accurately, may not uniformly translate into political behavior (Bellin 2018). In other words, those respondents who say that they support reformist movements in Islam on paper may not necessarily be willing to organize into an Islamic reform movement. While my inclusion of volunteer organization activism is likely to sooth this concern, hypothetically this problem may still resurface.

While I will be first to admit that these all are substantive and legitimate concerns, I maintain that in this study we come a step closer to understanding the possibility of Islamic reformation. It is my hope that shedding light on the theoretical conditions that underlie the rise of such movements as well as an initial empirical investigation as to where such movements may emerge will contribute to the greater debate and discussion of the possibility of reform movement in the Islamic world today.
References


Xäyretdinov (Khairutdinov), A. 2018. Musa Bigiyev govorit, chto nuzhno reformirovat’ ne islam, a nashe ponimanie islama [Musa Bigiyev says that it is not Islam that needs to be reformed, but our understanding of Islam]. Available at: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/392614 [Accessed: 23 August 2018].