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Oil Against Tradition in Chechnya and Ingushetia (1817–2007)

In 1817 Russia’s fortified frontier reached Sunzha and thus turned territories of today Chechnya and Ingushetia into a part of Russian Empire. In 1823 oil had been discovered in Chechnya. Historians of Caucasus argue that Russian new acquisitions in the region promised very little in terms of natural riches and oil by no means was a reason of invasion of Russia into the region at the beginning of the 18th century. Nevertheless the importance of mines was evident from the very beginning. Among the main obstacles for mines exploitation Russian administration officials admitted the absence of manpower, roads and other technical facilities [Derluguian, 1997, p. 75].

In the late 19th century Russia became one of the leading oil-producing regions in the world due to the oil of Apsheron (Azerbaijan) and Grozny oil-provinces. The ‘oil factor’ was getting to play more and more important role for the domestic policy of Russian Empire from the early 60-s of the 19th century. From 1920-s Grozny became the knot of regional pipe-lines and from early 1950s an industrial oil giant of Soviet economy. In Soviet epoch oil was declared to be a ‘strategic material’. Its reserves and processing problems could not be discussed openly by historians and in public but in military and professional circles. That could be a reason why Russian anthropologists and historians still skirt ‘the oil bogs’.

1 | Russian State councillor Litvinov wrote in 1804 to the Commander-in-Chief Prince Pavel Dmitrievich Titsianov on Imeretia and Megrila (Georgia): “The acquisition of mines also should not be overestimated by the government. Mines can not be exploited in parts where there is no population, no roads and no life-supporting crafts...Two generations can easily pass before the beginning bears its fruit”. Two generation passed and already in 1917 Russian universities mineralogy textbook informed of world oil importance of the region: “Oil is known to exist in many places of Earth, but the most famous ones in this respect is Pennsylvania at the Northern America and Caucasus, where oil is extracting in big amounts at Apsheron Peninsular and at the lands around Grozny. In comparison with the sites the other places are of an auxiliary meaning” [Glinka, 1917, p. 16].

2 | The process of capitalization and industrialization of Russia is not a focus of the paper, but those who are interested in detail could pay attention on the following published materials on oil, railway construction and urban development in the North Caucasus which worth to be mentioned in this respect:

The historical reminiscent of the Russian conquest re-emerged due to the chain of tragic events which lead to the “center-periphery” oil-and-territory conflict which burst into the war of 1994/5 and was officially declared to be over by Vladimir Putin in 2000.

The conflict attracted attention of journalists, political scientists, and specialists of conflict studies for its military and oil constituent. But their approaches were influenced by the 18th century historical studies focused on political and religious issues. The journalists’ conflict descriptions were full of deceiving images of the Chechen society as a traditional and archaic badly influenced by historiography of the previous centuries. Russian authorities were introduced in the materials as dim-witted and a dull force that violates without any sense and aim the representatives of the naively ‘romantic’ culture. Even the most brilliant samples of journalism did not define in plain words the main reason of the conflict.

The reason was a transition from soviet property ideology to post-soviet criminal schemes of oil privatization. It transformed the soviet property symbolism in Chechnya and gave birth to new ideological connotations and argumentation (nationalistic and religious) for the cruel socio-economic reality provoking new wave of interethnic and inner rivalry for petrodollars. It was quite up to date, modern and had nothing to do with political naivety and ‘romanticism’.

“Chechen society” (impersonalized in the Chechen elite of the epoch) turned oil into a powerful instrument of propaganda used by the seceding ideology. Chechens were explained that oil can give them personal prosperity and make Chechnya an independent part of the global world economy. The rhetoric influenced the religious situation in the region, traditional ethics


N. A. Schavrov. O gosudarstvennom znachenii dorogi iz Petrovsk v Baku (On state importance of the railway from Petrovsk to Baku), Tiflis, 1885.


The select bibliography of the books devoted to industrial development of the North Caucasus (including oil industry) can give a complete impression of representation of oil studies in Soviet-Russian historical studies:


L.V. Kupriyanova. Goroda Severnego Kavkaza vo vtoroi polovine 19 veka. K probleme rasvitiia kapitalizma v shir’ (Cities of the North Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century. To the problem of the widening of capitalism development.) Moscow, 1981.


3 | The drama (or, some would argue, probably correctly the tragedy) of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus had become a traditional historiography attraction already in the nineteenth century. The foundation of this tradition had been laid already during this longest war in Russia’s history, which began as escalating series of military campaigns in the last third of the eighteenth century, and which is officially declared won by Alexander II only in 1864’ [Derluguian, 1997, p. 19].
and morality; contributed revaluation of inner-group solidarity and social roles in the society. But writers preferred the discussions of cultural and historical heritage and ethnic stereotypes to the analysis of newly emerged problems. Consequently Chechen society is still widely regarded as a fossil of a medieval historical reality type rather then the result of eventful dynamics of modernization.

In the paper I shall try to evoke a discussion of the role that oil played in constructing a “new Chechnya” and “new Chechens” in three dimensions: local, national, and global. I shall show the fluctuate dynamics of Chechen social life and social structures transformations which expressed in several transitions among Vainakhs (Chechens and Ingushs) from social model which is characteristic to urban society, as opposed to rural one during the last 150 years after the Russian conquest.

I analyze the process with the help of the theory of social movement [Gamson, Meyer, 1966, Eickelman, Piscatori, 1966]. It explains how re-Islamisation process and protest against tradition was organized in Chechnya. In the section I shall also try to answer the question why privatization of Soviet state property (‘denationalization’) resulted into the constant threat of bloodshed, bad policies, and criminality. Why those who suffered from the violent policy support war-lords instead to supporting the ideology of heavy-handed rule? Why did they not support or did not offer the policy or ideology that could lead to state building instead of state-dissolution?

But the theory does not give us the answer why the negative mobilization can be successful. That is what the historical focus of the paper is about. Mutually supplementing historical and anthropological evidences related to the development of oil-extracting could correct a romanticized 19th century image of the ‘poor and primitive, but honest and noble highlanders’ expressed by the 18th century Russian poet: ‘Their God is Liberty, and their life is War, they only serve to Motherland and Freedom’ [Lermontov, 1988, p. 397].

THE CREATION OF CHECHNYA
AS A TERRITORY AND OF THE VAINAKH AS A UNITY

“Chechnya” (or former Chechen-Ingush Soviet Autonomous Republic) occupies the south-eastern part of the North Caucasus. Half of its territory are highlands convenient for agriculture and cattle breeding, and the rest are foothills and low-lands rich with oil. The territory is populated by the Vainakh. They speak different dialects of the Nakh language of Nakh-Dagestan group, a branch within the Ibero-Caucasian linguistic family.

The name Vainakh is a compound word. It consists of two parts — vain (Chech., Ing. meaning ‘our’ for all of the partners of a common communication’) and nakh (Chech., Ing. “people”) [Aliroev, 2005, p., 314, 321]. During the census of 1897 the name was registered by Russian authorities as an
ethnic one to indicate the group of peoples who differed themselves from their neighbors in the highlands (Dagestan speaking Muslim groups and groups of Christian peoples of former Kartl-Kakhety kingdom of the eastern Georgia) and at the foothills and lowlands (Turkish speaking Buddhists and Muslims and Iranian speaking Christians and Muslims). Vainakhs is a collective name used in Russian documents and historiography to indicate four big non-homogeneous groups called by Russians Chechens, Ingushs (now in Russia), Batsbi and Kists (now in Georgia). In 1783 between Russia and Kartl-Kakheti kingdom the Georgievsk Treaty was signed. According to it Russia gave political and military protection to the co-religious Georgian state from the devastation of Turkish and Persian invaders. After that, the Russian state invaded the mountains of the North Caucasus in order to secure communications with its new acquisitions in Transcaucasia. The first organized highlanders’ resistance to Russia dates back to 1785–1791. It was conducted under the Chechen Naqshbandiya Sufi movement leader Mansur. His efforts to establish a theocratic state on the basis of Islam religious doctrine and Shari’a practice failed because of opposition from many Vainakh tribes who did not share the ideology of Islam but shared the same socio-cultural heritage with their closer neighbors. Their complicated belief systems and ritual practice borrowed from the doctrines of Early Christian mysticism, Georgian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Yezidism, Tengri Cults, Zoroastrianism and Muslim mysticism formed a unique socio-cultural systems. Social connections between different tribes were formed in accordance with the system and influenced their political behavior. Inter-group solidarity between such groups was traditionally low. Mostly they acted as separate and mutually hostile tribes switching sides in conflicts. Depending on the situation they gave their support or opposed to the Russians who resettled from Volga to the Terek River in search of personal freedoms. Later the Cossack were to serve the Russian state as the ‘Terek Cossack Line Army’, and conflicts between them and highlanders became the most violent in the region during the Caucasus War.

The Russian name for the Vainakh highlanders is Ichkerintzy (Ichkerians). The Chechen word for the groups of people is Nokhmakhkakho. An obsolete meaning of the compound word is “people that are bound by blood” (makh meant ‘a payment for a killed member of the community’ [Aliroev, 2005, p. 346]. Nowadays the word makhkakh means “a relative, “a man from the same community”. The name “Ichkeria” has been chosen for the newly-proclaimed state by president D. Dudaev’s (1944–1996) government. The symbolic sense of the name is obvious. Chechen revolutionaries underlined the idea of archaic social institutions of revenge and blood feud, ethnic solidarity, and mutual responsibility revitalization among the highlanders who were the target group for secessionist propaganda and negative mobilization.

The Vainakh population of the foothills and lowlands calls themselves Nokhchiy (sg. m. — Nokhchi, sg., f. — Nokhcho). The name ‘Chechens' was
given by Russians to one group of Vainakh peoples of the village Chechenevo. Later it was spread over the population of the whole region by the Russian authorities. The same way the name Ingush (who call themselves Galgai) comes from the name of the village Anguscht.

One of the most impressive parts of the Vainakh history related to the period of total Islamization of the Vainakh groups. First and foremost, Islamization started under the influence of Caucasian war (1817–1859). During the war, local people overcome the grievances which are commonly known as a results of a conflict of interests: ‘the villages were burned, the fruit garden cut down, cattle and land requisitioned…’. In 1840 practically all of the Vainakh groups changed sides from Cossacks (Russians) and took the side of the Imamate (Muslims). It led to the following consequences: diverse Nokhchech-kh-speaking kin-groups began to mobilize manpower to defend their lands and to continue their migration down from the mountains. The migration made the Vainakh people go to the lands of the Sulak-river lowlands to Muslim groups of the Kumyks, and assimilated them. The traces of Kumyk component can be determined by Turkish geographic terms [Adjamatov, 2003, p. 57]. A strong clan system which was much weaker or did not exist at all in the earlier periods emerged. The Vainakh unity began to reveal its complicated character. Vainakh clans of valleys and highlands which were not yet Islamized (most of them opposed to newly-constructing state under the rule of Imam Shamil (1798–1871) and fought against him together with Russians at the beginning of Russian invasion of the Caucasus), began to join his warriors and converted to Islam [Al-Karakhi Muhammed Tahir, 1990, p. 10]. In Chechen and Ingush ethnicity Islam began to play an identity-constructing and differentiating role. From the time the Chechens and Ingushs actively started to separate themselves from ‘the Infidels’.

The second reason was the religious activity of the Muslim charismatic leader of the Vainakh peoples’ sheikh Kunta-hajji Kishiev (1800-). He offered a system of consolidation of numerous patronymic units (sg. taipa, Arab. taifa) on the basis of the Sufi doctrine of Qadiriyya tariqa separating them as a religious unity from Naqshbandiyya tariqa tradition which was popular among the peoples of Dagestan. It was not only a religious mission, but also an attempt to create an organizational system of Vainakh society alternative to the state system like Imamate but based on the network of the communities united on the basis of Muslim solidarity and mutual responsibility. He supposed that such a network could survive in any state with any official religion. According to the logic of his teaching he constructed the Vainakh unity by ‘one language-one ritual-one nation’ formula. Kunta-hajji succeeded to create a network of supra-clan religious communities on the basis of Qadiriyya tariqat doctrine [Khizrieva, 2005, p. 121–135]. But his efforts were not enough for cultural and political unification of all Nakh-speaking peoples who still divide themselves into Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods (the representatives of Naqshbandi tradition were adepts of Imam
Shamil and influenced by the idea of independent Muslim state). From the moment every Vainakh belonged to one gar (big family), taip (clan) and wird (religious brotherhood).

The process of Islamisation was accompanied by unification of Vainakh clans into Muslim unity and its simultaneous division into two bigger groups with the common rituals and ideology. The created brotherhoods system did not presuppose congruency to the local patronymic division among the Nakh-speaking peoples. It could be a reason why the system wavered after the leaving of Kunta-hajji. But the system survived and developed during the deportation of Vainakhs to Kazakhstan in 1944–1953/7 (known as period of de-modernization of the Vainakh population), and temporally restored its meaning as a device of local and family solidarity. The process of Vainakh Islamisation, formation of the network of sheikhs’ adepts brotherhoods and unity formation has been proceeding long after Kunta-hajji death up to the events of the First Russian (Bourgeois) Revolution in 1905. The most prestigious occupations for a man according to the system of values were to defend the Muslim community being a warrior of Jihaad and ‘a good Muslim’. The land and its reaches were considered to be “God blessing for being a good Muslims”.

But the problem of ethnic identification is still very acute among Vainakh groups of Orsthoi, Khoarto, Kokarkho, Koaso, Fappe, Tumkho, Tortsho, Targinho, Terho, Yalhoi, Chabarloi, Tsolo, Tsecho, a big group of Tzoro, Tzisdo, Khulaho, Galgai, Mialkho, Agahoi, Barhanoi, Batzo, Barkinhoei, Gorokho, Gapparho, a big group of Nazare people, Nokhmakhkako, Akkiloamo and other smaller Nakh-speaking patronomic units of highlands, foothills and lowlands. Chechen politicians and scholars still keep on reiterating that a mutual responsibility of Chechens is their ethnic characteristic. The mutual responsibility in practice is limited by the boundaries of a rather small community, the largest one can only count 200 or 500 men.

During the oil-boom and rapid rates of industrialization in 1860s ‘Chechen’ society went through painful changes. Their resident pattern changed. Vainakhs were removed from their lands and Cossack stanitzas (garrison-like Russian villages) were established there. The idea was ‘to cut’ the resident continuity of Vainakhs ethnic group. The Cossack stanitzas helped Russian authorities to keep security at roads and industrial objects. As a result, dozens of homeless people were wandering around Grozny. They could not go back to their lands, and they have no hope to get a dwelling in the rest of Vainakh villages because of lack of land in the highlands. Their

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4 According to the census of 2002 Chechen population is 1,103,686 people (according to the local census of 2004 they are 1,088,816 people). Density of the population is 72 per sq. km. The population is divided into rural (66.2%) and urban (33.8%). Average age is 23 years (21 years for males and 24 years for females). 98% of population are Chechens. In Grozny live 80,000 people.

According to censorship of 1989 (before ‘Perestroika’ period) the level of urbanization among Chechens of Chechen-Ingush republic was the lowest in Russia and the North Caucasus (Chechens — 26.6%, Avars — 32.3%, Ingushs — 37.6%, Ossets — 66.2%, Russians — 76.7%). The level of education was also the lowest among peoples of Northern Caucasus and was 61 person with higher education per 1000 (compare: Avars — 87, Ingushs — 84, Ossets — 185, Russians — 132, Jews — 546).
life and property were ruined; the values and traditional norms of their life were neglected. Some of them committed robbery and theft, the other propagated against the rule of ‘infidels’ or passed a beggarly existence. Kunta-hajji Kishiev instructed his adepts not to send such people away but try to share at least small plots of land with them. In contrast to that, Russian authorities issued administrative decrees according to which local rulers could arrest such people or to find an occupation for them. In order to get the local population away from their lands and property and to prevent the region to inundation of the homeless local people the Russian government negotiated with Turkish and Iranian authorities to organize the Muhajir movement (1860 — late 90s) and let such people to leave Russia. The policy failed in the eastern part of the North Caucasus. One can suppose that any state system regarded as alien to Islam among highlanders. Free manpower flooded into the new channel that was oil-industry and railways construction. This ‘war-born’ and ‘go-off’ population partly turned into oil workers, merchants, engineers, professional mullahs. They formed new ‘oil-born’ population of the region which by fate was to become active political force for future social-political movements among Vainakhs and to form new elite of the Vainakh highlanders.

STATE VERSUS TRADITION — COSSAKS VERSUS VAINAKHS — OIL VERSUS LAND

Population of the North Caucasus extracted and condensed oil already for several hundred years before the Russian conquest. From the 8th century when Islam established in Derbend region all income from salt and oil mines exploitation accumulated in this largest cultural and financial center of the North Caucasus (Minorsky, 1963, Aitberov, Shikhsaidov, Orazaev, 1993, p. 56). The first description of usage of oil by the peoples of the region one can find in early medieval text of Tarikh Darband (‘The History of Derbent’). Oil and salt from seasonal trips was included into waqf (property of Muslim

5 | ‘All Chechen who have good health but are wondering without any occupation over Groznaya Fortress must be arrested and put into prison. I also ask people to keep those ones who are homeless and poor at their place and give them any work to do and to pay for this work’ (Decree no. 24 of Gneral Vellik, Ruler of Chechen people, November, 18, 1857). [Chechentsy i Ingushi v sostave narodov Terskoi oblasti (Chechens and Ingushs among the peoples of Terek region. 1906, p. 55].
6 | ‘Sheikh Kunta-hajji said: ‘Once I was staying nearby the Prophet, let Allah give him peace, and he said onto me: Do your people follow my law? — Yes, we do! We follow your law! And he asked: What are you doing with a man who came up to you unexpectedly? I said: People treat him as being of low position and prevent him to start work out the land which is not his one and he obeys, and he asks them not to prevent him from work on the edge of their lands and might be they are pity with him and give him way to work out the rest of the edge of the land they are worked already out. But if it is no free land he will not get anything, and he does not ask them again. And the Prophet said: It is not my law. But the law is to give a stranger and to those who already live in this place equal right to work at the land which is communal (kharim)’ [‘Pouchenia sostopochtennogo sheikha i sovershennogo nastavnika hajji Kunta-al-Islakhani’, translated from Ingush and Arabic into Russian by G.A. Khizriyeva and I.L. Alexeev (into English by G.A. Khizriyeva), unpublished manuscript].
7 | ‘In 136 year of hijra (754 BC — M.I) the Khalifa throne ascended Abu Djafer Mansur and he appointed a son of Hasan Yezid to rule over Derbend. After Yezid invasion onto Derbend big army of Khazar tribe crossed the borderline of his state and besieged the town. Once at night the Khazars, coming to the fortress, put to its walls wooden poles and stubs willing to climb by them into the town. When the warriors learned the plan they overturned the flaming oil on them. Due to it the Khazars could not take a fortress and left it’ [Tarikh Darband].
communities) and kept in mosques. In some cases the waqf used to support financial state of community [Bobrovnikov, 2006, p. 21]. Written sources complement oral narration on sheikh Mansur oil-fire war against Russian penetration into Vainakh territories. He fired shallow oil pits and firewall occurred in front of his enemies. The legend says that kerosene / folk. karasin (etymologised by local people from Turk. kara — ‘black’ and some local languages — shin — ‘water’) ‘burned under soldiers’ feet’.

Vainakh peoples call oil mekhkadatta. This is an everyday expression for oil in the Chechen and Ingush languages. The compound consists of two words — ‘earth’ and ‘butter’10. One of my interview partners from the field-work site of Karabulak told that population of the site used mekhkadatta for heating. The name of the site has Turkish (Kumyk) origin and means ‘Black spring’ for oil collected in oil-lenses and goes out here on the surface. Local population extracted oil from 1.5 meter deep wholes made in earth. They used buckets covered with wattle to draw oil. The exposed deposits had been worked out by indigenous population in Grozny and Mamakaev gullies of Staropromyslovsky region (next to contemporary villages Braguny, Samashki (Chechnya), Achaluki, Karabulak (Ingushetia), Mikhailovskoye (now — North Ossetia).

During the conquest from thickly populated central part of Russian state people began to move into the new part. The first two Russian oil-men — the Dubinin brothers who appeared at the North Caucasus were serfs of duchess Panina. In 1823 they constructed in garrison town Mozdok a primitive 500 liter oil-processing cube. The cube was maintained inside a brick oven with ash-pit. The cope top covered the cube. Oil was heated in the cube; steam went through the coil pipe, condensed, and kerosene confluenced into the buckets. Forty buckets of oil gave sixteen bucks of kerosene. It was sent it to Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, and other trade cities of Russia. ‘The factory’ worked till 1847 and gave 1000 puds (16.000 kg or 121 barrels) of kerosene in all.11

The oldest oil layer is situated six kilometer north-west from Grozny. The lands were the communal property of Vainakhs. But after the Terek Cossack Line Army and the fortress Groznaya (‘The Terrible’) foundation in 1818 (the fortress got city status only in 1870) it became clear that practically all oil-springs of Grozny district occurred at the newly established Terek Cossacks’ administrative territories.

10 | A legend tells that Sheikh Mansur fought against Russian troops not with the weapons but with oil-flame which burnt out everything in fifteen km around the place of fire. The legend used in propagandistic movie about Chechen politician, businessman and oil-producer Kh.-A. Nukhaev [Karpov, 2003].
11 | Russian pud =16 kg, volume of Grozny ‘light’ oil = 0.83, 1m cubic of the label = 830 kg, 1 barrel = 159 l, k=1000: 159= 6,289, 1 barrel of the oil = 132 kg.
In 1855–60s at Grozny direction the active oil-trade started. Although oil was on their newly acquired land, the Cossacks never extracted oil. Their task was to maintain security in the region. For their service they received a salary and a plot of land where they can live, work at it and to feed their families. The government also attracted working power for servicing the state owned oil-pits. Local people rented the land plots from the Cossacks and work at it paying them for the rent. Some of them rented small plots specifically for oil-extracting. Private pits of businessmen of different ethnic origins Chikalov, Savdigalov, Mirsoev, Nitatukh and Akhverdov gave in the early 60-s of 19th century 12500 puds (1512 barrels) of oil per day. In 1885–1986 an oil-producer, Nitatukh, rented two more plots for ten years and his four pits gave in 1887 all the oil production of Terek district (Terskaya oblast'). Practically all his workers were of Chechen origin. At private enterprises of Nitatukh Chechens served at the laboratory for kerosene and oil refining. At the beginning of the 1890s Nitatukh sold his oil-plots and ‘Chechen laboratory’ to a lawyer Akhverdov. In 1893 r. one of the best specialist in oil-refining and oil-well cleansing was Labazan from the village of Urus-Martan; in 1893 he invented the method of deepening and cleansing of old oil pits. The same year according to the calculations of him and his Russian colleagues (geologist A.M. Kokoshin and L.I. Baskakov) that there was an oil-gusher and that it had oil from the depth of 132 m with a daily debit of 108 000 puds (1.728 000 kg or 13.090 barrels). This was on the on the 6th of October at the Yermolov oil-plot (Yermolovskyi uchastok), the day marks the beginning of industrial oil-pumping in Russia.

Akhverdov made six more pits and all of them struck oil. But the seventh pit made in May, 1985 gave him a real triumph. By the 27th of August from, the depth of 141 m it gave a gusher with the daily debit of 16 000 barrels. During the first three years it gave 17.529.000 barrels (according to other sources 52.560. 000 barrels) of oil. In 1895 the newspaper “Terskiye Novosti”(‘Terek News’) informed its readers: ‘Oil goes in all directions... and floods the neighboring mines. The atmosphere is so saturated with gas, especially in the canyons that it is difficult to breath. The situation is extremely dangerous for possible conflagration from any careless act with fire’. The news on Akhverdov’s oil-gushers immediately spread into the world. Grozny became famous for its oil and gas riches. The same year English businessmen established joint stock company ‘Petrol de Grozny’ in Brussels. Belgians had got 24 thousand shares in this enterprise. The Russian South became popular among western capitalists. The general square of elaborated oil plots in Tersky district (the lands around Terek river) was 619 hectares [Ragozin, 1928, p. 118].

The Cossack Line Army had 170 shallow pits. They preferred to invite the workers of Russian origin. For the reason of mutual hostility, land competition and state mistrust to local population the Cossacks did not invite the Chechens to work at the state derricks. The competition between private and
state businessmen started. From the beginning the competition acquired the character of ethnic opposition between Russians and non-Russians, state enterprises and private ones. The problem was that the income from the profitable branch of industry distributed in unequal ways. The Terek Cossack Line Army had got 80 percent from the regional budget in money from rent of the arguable lands. At the same time the local people Vainakh (mostly Chechens) who worked at all levels of oil-extraction and production at the lands that were of their traditional property was separated from the income distribution. The interethnic situation in the region was complicated by the fact that the First Russian Revolution took place in 1905, and at the moment Russia was just begun to re-construct the system of administrative rule. The government lagged with the modernization of the management system of the oil based economic sphere of the region.

From 1905 to 1914 the already existing rivalry between Cossacks and Vainakhs (Ingushs and Chechens) became very acute. On the one hand, Vainakh population tried in all ways possible to regain the lands, an act they regarded as the “restoration of historical justice”.  

Documents register the escalation of mutually hostile activity of Chechens, Ingushs and Cossacks of the region, their petitions to the authorities and administration with pleas for help against the opposite side’s violence as well as against violence and unpredictable actions of the Russian military and civil administration. The absence of any adequate actions led to desperation on both sides — Vainakhs and Cossacks.

One of the characteristics of the Russian monopolistic capitalism was the exclusive role of state in oil industry and land regulations. Cossacks were loosing the political leadership in the region together with the weakening of the Russian state because the influence of the group was based on the state economy leadership and oil-rent prosperity. The Vainakhs have neither the administration understanding nor economic compensation for national humiliation. Only WWI delayed a militant opposition: many Vainakhs by the moment joined The Russian Imperial Army. It was the most prestigious occupation for men. Cossacks and Vainakhs were mobilized and were fighting

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12 Petition from Ingushes to the First State Duma:
From the speech Gaidarov at State Duma session on January, 28, 1909.

«Petersburg. To the Chair-man of S[ate] D[uma]. We, Ingushes, in number of 50.000 from ancient time live at the territories which are now Terskaya oblast, working at our lands. The whole small people always was a kind of unite agricultural community which never knew division into classes, privileged groups, and was only ruled by community principle. But after the 60-s, when Caucasus had been conquered, local administration, embraced with the idea of Russification of this territory began to take from us our plots and lands and put Cossacks instead, forgetting the fact that our people helped Russia in many critical episodes of Russian history. Now two thirds of our lands, took by force from us was given to Cossacks’ hands and we, Ingushes should lease our own lands and plots from them in order to survive. In average we, Ingushes, pay annually more than 30.000 rubles as rent-payment. And this sum is not anything else but taxes for Cossacks benefit, and the most unpleasant fact about it is that we should pay this taxes for our own property which was ours for many thousand years.

But to our pity Cossacks did not limit themselves with their actions [against us] by this. They decided, as we can see, to destroy us totally. Cossaks use everything to find a possibility to damage us, or to kill us. We paid already 50.000 R. to them and due to the fact that administration is totally Cossacks’ and chief administrator is also an ataman of Terek Cossack Line Army Squadron, he did nothing to help us, but on the contrary still encourage them in this direction.»
together against Germany in 1914 as they did it in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905–1906. The wars drew back manpower from the region. Russia was defeated in 1914, and in 1917 the oil-front embraced all of the southern provinces. Russian administration began to realize that the state sector of oil industry was destroying but private sector worked effectively being under the watch of local people. In March, 1917 the Russian administration aggravated interethnic rivalry by the decision to give all rights for industrial extraction of oil in Grozny district to the Terek Cossack Line Army as a state structure. It was a serious blow to the Russian private companies in the region. This decision provoked violence. Cossacks started energetic activity to make the restoration of the economic influence of the state in the region. The rumors that soldiers began to kill Vainakhs appeared. In 1917 all Chechens left Grozny. The whole summer of 1917 the pogroms at the state oil-extraction objects (including railways) of Grozny region were held. State pipe-line ‘Grozny — Petrovsk (now Makhachkala)” was destroyed. On 21, September, 1917 the Conference of Producers and Factories Commission had been gathered by Russian oil industry workers. It proclaimed itself to be ‘strike committee’ and the decision of the Committee was to start a continuous strike (‘bessrochnaya zabastovka’) from the 27th of September. On 21, September, 1917 the Conference of Producers and Factories Commission had been gathered by Russian oil industry workers. It proclaimed itself to be Strike Committee and the decision of the Committee was to start a continuous strike (‘bessrochnaya zabastovka’) from the 27th of September.

Vainakhs also gathered in November, 1917 in Starosunzhenskaya village. They presented the administration an ultimatum to remove troops from Grozny and to take away weapons from the workers. The infantrymen of squadron 111 and 252 Samara infantry division left Grozny, but soon the 111th squadron returned to Grozny to help the armed workers and Cossacks who stayed in Starye Promysly region (region of the ‘Old Oil Pits’).

In November so called abrek bandits (actually armed Chechens) fired most of the producers and besieged Grozny where the extracted oil stocks stayed (Vladikavkaz railway was destroyed and it was no way to transport the stocks). The government demanded to close down all state pits. The only pipe-line of the region which proceed to function was Akhverdov’s one. This private pipe-line was constructed at the end of summer in 1914. It worked in spite of all the demands of authorities for Chechen workers’ supported its functioning. The siege of Stary Promysly and Grozny continued until May, 1918. Chechens destroyed pump-stations in Gudermes and Temirgoi, demolished the bridges. Due to the events of regional turmoil of 1918 the number of oil workers in the region decreased from 11.312 men to 3.659 men. Russians were leaving industrial objects. In the flaming gushes a quarter of Russian Empire year budget fired away and most of Chechen population returned to agriculture. The conflict which started as a conflict of interests ended as a conflict of values. The dearest values for Cossacks were loyalty to
the state and honest service. The most important values for the Muslims was battling state dishonesty and monopolistic practices, ‘especially in the area of necessities of life’ and illegal methods to gain property by land-and-oil renting which ‘leads to the growth of unlimited fortunes and division of society into two classes’ incompatible with their image of the world [Mitchel, 1969, p. 232, 252].

GROZNY OIL IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL AFFAIRES

The history of economic integration of Grozny district into all-Russia economic system as well as economic globalization Russia faced first to at the beginning of the 20th confirms the idea that economic globalization has sharpened conflict and engendered a defensive kind of collective action [Rodrik, 1997]. The peak of oil-extraction in Russia falls on 1901. From the time Western oil companies started to openly compete with Russian state ones on the turf of the Russian Empire. In Russia the non-state sector of oil industry and non-Russian capitalists were collaborating with the governments of western oil-producing countries (Germany, France, the USA, and Great Britain). As a result of the competition the oil-extraction in Russia began to drop. There were several reasons for it. Firstly, it happened due to the oil-prices damping policies of ‘Standard Oil’ and ‘Shell’. They occupied the Russian oil-market with the cheap petrochemical industry products. Secondly, Russian government conducted unfriendly taxes policy of the branch of industry for Russian companies (40 percent) and it made modernization of technologies unpractical for Russian oil-traders. Thirdly, out of date drilling and oil-processing technologies gave no opportunities to develop the industry.

The competition accompanied by local revolutionary and nationalistic movements which were getting force. The epicenters of the activity became Baku (Azerbaijan) and Batumi (Abkhazia) oil districts where J. Stalin (1889–1953) — the future leader of Soviet state — started his revolutionary carrier as a member of Party of Bolsheviks. In July of 1903 a strike of oil-industry workers in Baku (and afterwards in Batumi) took place and 225 oil derricks were burnt for 14 days. In the 6–10th of August of 1905 had happened Armenian-Azeri massacre13. Some blamed Bolsheviks for the organizing the event and getting money from German government to support Bolsheviks. The other blamed Azeri nationalists for the cooperation with Turkey against Russian interests. In connection with the events in Azerbaijan the importance of North Caucasus oil for Russia increased. It gave in 1911 it

13 | Government did nothing to stop the disaster. It became clear that some political forces were taking part in mobilizing so called ‘working masses’ for the event. To the moment the ‘working masses’ consisted of 23 percent of workers of Armenian origin, 11 percent of Azeri origin, the rest 66 percent were unqualified workers of Persian, Kurd origin and others. In the 20th of August, 1905 the newspaper Nefteoe delo (‘Oil Business’) wrote:

“The massacre became for the oil-workers absolutely unpredictable. At the beginning the event seemed to be so strange that one can not believe that all this was taking place in reality” [Ragozin, 1928, p. 107]. The day is known by mass assassinations, robbery, fires. At the end of the catastrophe occurred that the oil market belonged to the Rockefeller [Ragozin, 1928, p. 110].
gave 13.5 percent of oil produced at the state enterprisers in 1911 (4.4 percent in 1902). To 1914 Grozny oil district became the biggest center of world oil-extraction and the center of intersection of the economic interests of Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Iran and Turkey. Turkish troops moved to Caucasus. Russia was exhausted by wars and inner instability and Bolshevik government lead by Trotsky signed the treaty of Brest in July, 3. Under the condition of this Treaty Transcaucasia had been declared to be an independent territory. Lenin called the conditions ‘shameful’ for Soviet state. At the end of July, 1918 Turkish troops welcomed to Baku by the local Public Council (‘Bakinski Sovet’) where Bolsheviks were in minority. Afterwards Turkish troops used the weakness of new-born Soviet state and continued the invasion northward by the shore of the Caspian Sea. They ignored the conditions of the Treaty and invaded Dagestan city of Derbent which remained Russian territory under the Piece of Brest. The Ottoman troops were stopped by contradictions between Great Britain and Ottoman Empire which evoked because of oil regions of Mesopotamia. Starting the expedition from Basra British troops began to defend the interests of Great Britain against Turkey in Palestine and at the territory of contemporary Iraq. The Don River valley was occupied by Germans and general-ataman Krasnov established there with the help of Germans autonomous state of Don Cossacks. All the contradictions did not prevent lord Kerson to say (on the 20th of November, 1918 at the Conference of Oil Allies) that they ‘swam’ to their victory ‘on the oil wave’ [Ragozin, 1928, p. 34].

The Grozny oil region was encircled by occupied territories. The city of Grozny was blocked, oil industry destroyed. The Cossacks wanted to establish the autonomy like the Don Cossacks and welcomed squadrons of former Russian Army lead by general Denikin. Hostility and clashes of land and oil interests left for Vainakh population the only way out was to support Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks’ leaders Sergo Ordzhonikidse and Sergei Kirov helped to maintain a dialog between local population and Soviet government and fought together with Vainakhs against armed Cossacks of General Denikin’s Army. Vainakh population was so grateful for the support that they even buried Russians killed during the battles of the Civil war battles together with Muslims at Muslim cemeteries that was an occurrence that had never happened before.

During the first months of Soviet rule the restoration of the destroyed oil economy of Grozny district began. The question of global competitions in the sphere had been closed once and forever by Bolsheviks. On the one hand, memories of destruction produced by the competition by ‘protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism’ prevented the Soviet government from international cooperation in this sphere. On the other hand, the same experience pushed the newly formed administration to change the loyalty of the indigenous population for land and oil. The loyalty was reached by means of a policy of transition of Cossacks from the region. In the former Cossack vil-
lages Vainakh population came. It was a socialist style of property redistribution. Most of local population celebrated the event. Within the limits of socialist doctrine all lands and riches belonged to 'people'. In valley Vainakh popular understanding they were just “the people” and the act regarded as the desired restoration of historical and social justice. Vainakh peoples were promised religious autonomy and freedom. Soviet government began to solve the problem of manpower by inviting the local population to work at the petrochemical industrial objects. By 1, April, 1929 Grozny became the capital of the Vainakh statehood. At the moment the district consisted of 500,000 population with 6000 members of Communist Party and 10,000 Comsomol (the Soviet youth organization in the USSR — Young Communists’ League) members. Soviet authorities fostered the Grozny proletariat and gave the city a status of a capital in order to reach the influence of the working class on the agrarian population that was fragmented into different parties organized by family-clan-brotherhood principle [Molodezhnaya smena, 2003].

Grozny and Vladikavkaz (Soviet name is ‘Ordzhonikidze’) with mixed Chechen-Ingush-Russian-Ossetian population began to restore its industrial meaning in regional and national economy. In 1920 Soviet oil-production unity of Groznyi Oil (“Grozneft”) was established. The industrial unity (“proizvodstvennoye ob’edinienie”) is still working in Grozny. Now half-destroyed, it comprised thirty nine industrial objects (six oil-extracting units (“upravlenia”), six drilling units and one academic institute). It developed nineteen multi-facet and one gas condensing layers [Neftianaya entziklopedia, 2002, p. 249]. But as for land and oil property it began to gain the symbolic character for the people. So the economy was declared to become ‘People’s Property’ (“narodnaya sobstvennost”).

Within the limits of “traditional” ideology of the population of the north-eastern Caucasus the land and its riches were their clandestine property. The fact that it was declared the property of soviet socialist state was not very important for population because very few of local half-agrarian population were familiar with the concept of communism construction. The only thing made sense: they won their fight for land property and its riches. Industrialization was conducting on the background of Cultural Revolution of the First Five-year plan (‘ pervaya piatiletka’) (1928–1932) of economic development. The result was an exponential turn of agrarian population into urbanized. Social groups’ formation on the basis of urban population culture continued. The mode of life has been changing rapidly. Everything had the adjective ‘the first’ at the time: the first Ingush writers and poets, the first Chechen historians, the first meeting of the North Caucasus women and etc. New values of social life were elaborating: prestige of secular and women education, textbooks in newly invented national alphabet, atheistic views and propaganda, collective labor for ‘social benefit’ etc. The parallel set of traditional values deeply rooted in the society had been preserved by ‘modernized’ population only in the family sphere. The rest of population tried to
serve their identity in all possible ways.Muslim holidays, rituals and traditional crafts were called ‘survivals’ of the pre-socialist epoch, the norms of traditional regulation in the communities (adat norms) were forbidden. The above described ‘modernization’ was introduced by the state using cruel methods, the fight of Bolsheviks against the ‘survivals’ was violent [Bennigsen, 1985]. Hundreds of people who dared to maintain traditional mode of life openly were prosecuted and died in exile or prisons [Avtorkhananov, 1996, p. 161–192]. Oil industry was now “the property of socialist state” as before it was the property of state monopolies. The politics of Soviet state began to remind the worst samples of Russian Empire politics and in early 40-s Vainakhs revolted. But new war — the World War II — again reduced the protest (men were mobilized and joined ‘Red Army’), and delayed the conflict resolution for several years.

In the early 70-s the world ‘oil crisis’ took place. National and Islamist social movements covered the Arab world [Andreasian, Ushakova, 1979, p. 6–7]. Simultaneously there were several uprisings in Chechen-Ingush Soviet Autonomous republic (divided from the rest of Muslim world for sixty years of Soviet rule) lead by educated people and industrial workers of the republic. Speakers and organizers demanded at the meetings from the state to compensate the losses of deportation and to give them equal rights with Russians to work in the oil-industry. The organizers were labeled as ‘nationalists’ and prosecuted. But the events showed that Soviet Vainakh national elites returned to the political stage after many years of national deprivation and humiliation and shall fight for the economic and political heights of the republic.

**OIL — DEPORTATION — REHABILITATION**

In the early 40s the leaders of the USSR learned from the reports of oil-producers that Grozny lenses-oil stocks were exhausted but oil lands of two other Muslim regions of Russia such as Tatarstan, Bashkiria (The Volga River regions) and the West Siberia had good perspective. In 1943 oil in Volga-Ural region (“the second Baku”) had been discovered. West Siberian oil prospecting gave hopeful results. In 1944 Vainakhs (Chechens, Ingushs, and Kists) were deported into Kazakhstan. The two events might have some links. Some

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14 One of my interview partners told that ‘mothers were crying when sending children to school and threw away their textbooks’. She added also: “The most awful thing at Soviet school was a necessity to say a lie that was to say against our religion. It was very cruel. Our parents taught us never say a lie and they punished us when we tried. But in Russian school we could not survive if to say the right things we were taught by our parents” [FWM, 2004].

15 The first oil was discovered in West Siberia in 1959 at Konda river near village of Shaim. The early 60-s was the epoch of intensive development of oil-extracting industry in Soviet Union. The leaderships of Siberian oil became obvious but petrochemical industry was still linked to the regions of traditional oil extraction [Khimia nefti i gaza / Ed. V.A. Proskuriakova. SPb, 1995, p. 11]. Without Siberian oil the rent principle proclaimed by the new Chechen state could provide every ethnic Chechen and Ingush with 1,5 liter of roar oil per person per year. So the Ingushs were immediately excluded from the process of redistribution, but even without this part of population the rent-principle did not work.
of my interview partners found the links by reconstructing the following logic of the deportation decision making. Oil layers in Grozny demanded expensive deep vertical and horizontal drilling. The USSR was fighting at fronts of WWII and there was no manpower or money for new drilling technologies, inventing and maintaining. There was no money either to construct oil industry objects in Tatarstan where oil was easy to get and its quality was better. So the decision was to change the specialization of the district and to make Grozny-city a giant of oil transition and re-distribution. Oil transition projects demanded to strengthen security in the region. Stalin decided to cancel with possible threat of instability along the pipe-lines in the region. It was not difficult to predict the instability because the local population was disappointed in Soviet rule, cruelty in conducting war and religious repressions. From his own revolutionary experience Stalin learned how vulnerable the oil industry is. He dispatched to the region KGB officers in order to observe the current situation and soon got a report on political and religious state of affairs there. The report and his life experience which he had got working with oil regions population convinced Stalin to make preventive steps in security maintenance. In 1944 the statehood unit of Vainakhs was abolished. It was the only territory in former Soviet Union which suffered from Stalin’s repressions so badly: the deportation accompanied with massacres. Soviet state propaganda could not mention oil transition project as a real cause of the events because of the atmosphere of secrecy that accompanied any industrial project in the USSR. Government could not declare that it sacrificed peoples’ lives for oil because it could destroy the main ideal principle of Soviet rule ‘everything for a human being, everything for wellbeing’. The only way the government could act was to blame the local population. Other peoples of the highlands and foothills who preferred traditional life to ‘modernisation’ (Avars, Laks, Balkars, Kalmyks, etc.) were also deported or partly moved from the territories of their traditional residence. But nobody treated them as Soviet people enemies. Anyway, the result for all the groups was the same. One third of deported and moved people died from hunger, unknown illnesses and depressions. The veterans of war found their families far from their home places. Politically active population (‘heroes of war’ as the newspapers called them) from among highlanders of the North Caucasus was scattered all over the Soviet Union and their possible activity neutralized.

16 | The logic is reconstructed from the reports of oil-producing enterprises leaders and scholars of the USSR. The reports collected in the materials of North-Caucasus conference of oil geologists which took place in 1932. [For detail: Severo-Kavkazskaya konferentziia geologov-neftinikov of 1932 / Ed. I.O. Brod. Leningrad, 1933].

17 | All the villagers from Khaibakh were burnt in an abandoned mosque.

18 | Similar way Stalin mistrusted to Muslim population lived along the new pipe-lines of Tatarstan. Some former Tatarstan Communist party members tell that they were familiar with the documents in which the plans of deportation of Tatars were discussed. Instead the population was subjected to assimilation. The ethno-demographic picture in Almetievsk oil-district in Tatarstan was changing rapidly: population of Almetievsk in 1949 was 3078, in 2000 it consist of 141,6 thousand people. In 1926 there were 2,8 percent of Russians in the region, (1970–46,3 percent, 2000–42,9 percent). Cultural policy linked to the demographic policy: Tatar schools and kindergartens construction was even not presupposed at new oil-towns [A. Khabudzhanov, 2006]. No wonder that nowadays the region is the most unstable in political respect. The radical Islamist activity there ended in Kukmar (Tatarstan) oil district explosion of the federal pipe-line in December, 1999.
The most striking result of the deportation was that the urban population intermingled with rural and again turned into a rural one. The urban population was ‘new people’ for highlanders. From their point of view the people were spoiled by international and even antireligious marriages and by inter-wird connections, by urban life. The roots of this alienation and controversy of interests between two big parts of the local population can be traced back to the days of the beginning of industrialization and connected with oil production. Industrial development of the region fragmented politically and socially the universalism agrarian economic-cultural type of Vainakh peoples. In the industrial region such as Grozny it was not prestigious to be a kolkhoznik (a worker at a collective farm). The highlanders (majority of Vainakh population) for many years could not play a political role in Vainakh society. But being deported the agrarian population adapted better to the new conditions. Their leading role in the nation survival became obvious. They restored traditional and ‘obsolete’ forms of communal support, religious life mechanisms which were not ‘modern’, but helped people cope with psychological trauma, to overcome the cultural shock, fears and frustrations. In deportation the ethno-religious networks were re-created. The networks became social fabric of the Vainakh society. After deportation the Vainakh networks became ‘global’ within the borderlines of the Soviet Union. The “globalization” of the networks ‘provided new resources and ideas on which advocacy groups can capitalize to reframe political debates and struggles’ (Keck, Sikkink 1998).

The Vainakh highlanders began to return to their destroyed villages in the late 1950s. But the quality and standards of life of rural population in the highlands were even worse then in the lowlands. To stay there without state support was practically impossible and Vainaks left them.

One more consequence of deportation was disproportionate employment opportunities for the population in restored Chechen-Ingush republic. Partly due to a low level of education (primarily the result of residence patterns in deportation), partly due to public opinion according to which they were still considered to be the Soviet ‘people’s enemies’ (‘vragi naroda’), even after their return to their homelands, the Ingush and Chechens were not recommended for leading positions in the political structures of the Soviet state. They were not permitted to work at the important objects of Chechen economy as administrators nor at the “strategic objects of peoples’ economy”. Only some of them could work in oil industry where representatives of Slavic population worked, despite the fact that the Chechens and Ingushs were formally “title nations” (‘titlnaya natsia’) in this Soviet autonomy. After the thirteen years of deportation and official rehabilitation, their civil rights continued to be violated by this separation from the most profitable branch of industry and prestigious occupation. The only way to get wellbeing was to become the USSR Communist Party official, military or militia officer of higher rank.
*Perestroika* gave a new start to the old struggle for oil and land return process. ‘Chechen factor’ came into the life of post-soviet Russia becoming a part of political and socio-economic transformations provoked by «new thinking» introduced by M. Gorbachev. The idea of Russiia neo-liberal economists and politicians of early 1990s to give state support for the private property owners impressed Chechen and Ingush elite and motivated political and economic activity among them. ‘New thinking’ (*novee myshleniye*) policy were based on new symbols and values such as “personal success”, “power of money”, “liberty”. They were not rooted in mass consciousness and had been alienated by most of population. Liberal ideology in its classical expression occurred to be the ideology of political minority. The ideology found its expression in the politics of government neglecting and transformed at the post-Soviet space into the ideology of robbery and theft. Predatory activity of elite, violence and criminal money making took place under the slogans of liberalization of economy, privatization, freedom and independence, incorporation into the club of democratic countries. According to the polls of VCIOM (All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies) the slogans such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘orthodoxy’, ‘liberalization’ supported less then 3 percent of respondents, most of respondents (47 percent) voted for ‘normal civil life’. In general the people of former Soviet Union were not at all satisfied by the process of reformation of the society resulted in many unpredictable problems. The situation also revealed and sharpened the delayed property problems. The problems gave a start to ethno-religious movements. The starting point for Chechen political part was a position according to which Russia is responsible to restore historical and social justice. Their demands were satisfied and the Federal law on rehabilitation was adopted by Supreme Soviet on April, 26, 1991. Giving comments to the Chechen-Ingush government newspaper Doku Zavgaev did not even mention oil industry. It runs as follows: ‘The Supreme Soviet of Russia adopting this historical document took into consideration literally all corrections and offerings of Chechen-Ingush delegation...Big efforts were made to exclude from the law an article according to which the territorial question could be regulated only by negotiation between parties (Ossetia, Daghestan, and even Georgia — M.I.) because such article could block the possibility of the full restoration of violated justice’ (*Golos Checheno-Ingushetii*, 1991). Immediately after the law of deported nations’ rehabilitation was issued the Autonomy republic was covered with the network of Rehabilitation Committees. Their task was to estimate the sum of the lost property. It occurred evident soon that the state will fail to compensate the losses for all people. Doku Zavgaev who was moderate in respect of realization of the law was substituted by charismatic and ambitious general D. Dudaev who talked about sovereignty of Chechen state and his desire to see Chechnya powerful and independent actor of global oil economy system. From 1992 the propagandist machine of Chechen revolution started to work for negative
mobilization using the nationalistic discourse and playing on the memory of deportation. Disability of Russian state to compensate the losses (the aim was declared in the Preambular section of the law of rehabilitation) provided the success for negative mobilization.

D. Dudaev (1944–1996) showed at the privatization of oil industry as the main source of ‘the historical justice’ restoration. ‘Revolutionaries of ‘independent Ichkeria’ began to restore it with the cruelty of Chechen oil and bank mafia, slave trade, aggressiveness towards the governments of the North Caucasus republics on the problems of arguable lands and oil (Idrisov, 2002). Oil and land fever’ captured the Vainakh population of region. Neighboring to Vainahs and fever peoples began to demand from the federal government to take away oil industry from the hands of innumerous Chechen ruling ethnic socio-economic militant units which made oil the most dangerous instrument of political pressure and economic blackmail. The provocative politics of Chechen elite in the region increased interethic tension and made Ossets to start ‘preventive’ steps. In 1992 this tension burst massacre in Prigorodny raion of North Ossetia in which 5000 Ingushs were killed. It should be mentioned that the place was popular in the 19th century as oil productive. The North Ossetia used the preventive measures in order ‘to restore the ethno-demographic balance’ as officially was called the horrible tragedy.

The event also divided politically two culturally close big ethnic groups because of indifferent attitude of D. Dudaev government to the grievances of Ingush people. ‘Refugees from Prigorodnyi raion went to the highlands and there they were cut out from lowlands and the rest of the world. They suffered from hunger together with those who took them into their houses. They had nothing… And the Dudaev to whom we sent messages and asked to help our Ingushs asked money for airplanes! We collected the sum. It was very big. From the days I do not want even to listen about uniting with Chechens into one republic’, — told me a witness of the event [FWM, 2004].

The massacre provoked by official Ichkeria was the presage of full-fledged military campaign against self-declared state. Thus, Ingush separated from Chechens. Ossets blocked any effort of Vainakh people to return to their homes in the North Ossetia. Cossacks remembered their deportation in early 20s of the 20th century and started prevented Vainakhs and other people from Caucasia to settle in the comparatively safe and stable places of the South of Russia. Georgia began to accuse Chechen side in interfering in inner affaires of Georgian state. When Dagestan officials thought where to put Lakh, Avars and Kumyks from former Chechen villages of Dagestan the population bought weapons to oppose to possible invasion of Chechens. Readiness of Chechen revolutionaries to realize the law by force became obvious to 1993. Predatory oil privatization became a reason of anti-Chechen rhetoric at the North Caucasus, and then in Russia. The North Caucasus was on alert of a new war.
"THEORY OF INCOME AND PRACTICE OF DAMAGES"\(^{19}\)

Theoretically Chechen oil might be a source of ethno-national integration in state-building process as it happened in Azerbaijan, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Turkmenistan and in Russia itself. Income from oil is supporting the other spheres of social life in them. In Chechnya it did not happen. Instead, Vainakh ethnic norms, inner social and interethnic relations were damaged. Chechen newspapers of early 90s variegated with letters where the readers express their confusion by the fact that Chechens were stealing from each other, destroying kolhozes, made by their compatriots, expressing disrespect to elder people, committed robbery and rape, insulting women, enslaving people. The constant motif of the letters is a question ‘Are we the same people?’ One of Chechen refugee in Ingushetia who survived in deportation and in both wars and massacre in Prigorodny raion in 1992 in the following words commented the state of Chechen society: ‘It is not true that collective grievances unite people. It disunites. It is difficult to say, but I must say. We did not become better in deportation. People became illiterate, unprincipled, and angry. And now we are the same. It haunts us. And this new war will make nobody better’ [FWM, 2004].

The marginalization touched all spheres of Chechen society and one can read much about it in different articles devoted to negative mobilization and ethnic intolerance among Chechens. The only writer who noticed the oil constituent in this process was Chechen writer Vakhit Itaev. He wrote in September, 25, 1991, in the newspaper ‘Golos Checheno-Ingushetii’: ‘Rumors are flying over the republic that there are countless treasures in our lands’ depth and we can sale them and live as in heaven. Common people are provoked by this because they never lived happily. The rumors are deceiving. It is a criminal deed to provoke people in such a way. Look, at the Japanese islands there is no oil and no wood, but Japanese people became rich and powerful nation by their laborious life. Labor is the main treasure of any nation …We must repeat the only truth: it is impossible to become free if everybody will defend his own freedom, but we shall be free society if every citizen will defends the freedom of another one. Russians had come to our ancestors from slavery and sufferings. Today one can see Russians on the alert. It means that we changed radically and do not remind our ancestors more. We must think the fact over’. But the same issue presents “the provocative article” under the title ‘The West will help us’ (‘Zapad nam pomozhet’) on the western interests in oil industry. It is not easy to understand from the article that it tells about investments into Siberian oil, but not into oil industry of Grozny. Thus, the witnesses of deportation, Ingush journalists and Chechen writer

\(^{19}\) The title of the subsection is borrowed from now imprisoned president of oil — company "UKDS" Mikhail Khodorkovsky In Introduction for the book ‘Russkaya neft’ he wrote: “The result of our study of oil production in Russia was overwhelming. We realized that the most popular now technical discoveries of oil-engineers in Russia ignored not only Soviet historians but also historians abroad. …’ M. Khodorkovsky, Introduction’ // Russkaya neft’. Moskva: Olimp-business, 2003, 1.
agreed that transformations turned into marginalization of population pro-
voked by oil-and-land greedy character of Chechen revolution and falsity of
its revolutionaries.

As for oil stocks amount in Chechnya it turned to be clear very soon
after the beginning of Chechen ethno-national revolution that they are not
enough to provide every Chechen family with happy life. The point is that
oil extraction today is very expansive because it need in some cases 7 km
deep drilling and in some cases it needs also to drill horizontally to get a layer.
The technology needs high-skilled workers and much money. The only place
Chechens could get oil and gas freely was federal pipe-line. And one more
observation linked to quality of Grozny oil. Chechen elite still boasts that
Grozny oil served for airplanes. It is true. But it does not mean that it is of
good quality. Quiet on the contrary. Its low quality made specialists to use it
for airplane engines which can work on kerosene. It is impossible to use it
for car-engines. It also educes the toxic products of burning into atmosphere.

So the debate on ethno-national state and sovereignty was also
launched into the society. For propagandistic purposes the appropriate cul-
tural frame has been chosen. It became Islam (Wahhabi political and reli-
gious rhetoric) and political heritage of Soviet epoch. The lessons of Civil war
had not been taken into consideration.

The propaganda consisted in some slogans reminding the slogans of
early Soviet epoch: ‘Oil and riches of the land belong to Chechen People!’,
‘Homelands to Chechen and Ingush Peoples!’ which soon transformed into
nationalistic slogan ‘Russians go to Riazan’, ‘Ingushs go to Nazran’. Bolsheviks’
slogans were transformed and completed with one more component — ‘oil’.
Chechen revolutionaries did not want to waist time for negotiations. ‘Presi-
dent’ Dudaev and his ‘ministers’ began to force the decisions. The spirit of
Bolshevism defined the tone and style of their speeches. 29, February, 1992,
Dudaev blamed in the newspapers that Federal Center which organized ac-

20 | In spite of providing Russia with the products of petrochemical industry Russian authorities continue financial and economy block-
ade. Debts of Russian Federation increase to one trillion rubles. At the same time working people of the republic do not get salaries, pen-
sions, social payments. I do demand to provide the republic with money in three days. In other case I leave for myself a right to discontinue
industry products providence (including the products of petrochemical industry). It was an ultimatum which was impossible to satisfy.
Russia was in financial-economic crises and all so called ‘working people’ of Russia did not get salaries, pensions, social compensations.
This telegram in his period could be regarded as a political extravagancy of a young and unprofessional politician.
western or eastern political and economic elite. The willing of Chechen elite to enter into global world and to represent Chechnya in the world as an important actor of oil oriented world policy was understandable. But it had nothing to do with independence and sovereignty of this small half-agrarian republic which suffered from weakness of inner fragmentation and with the oil oriented economy deeply depended on the other regions of Russia. Oil sector of Chechen economy began to serve for the interests of several groups of ambitious, and constantly quarrelling local politics.

The cultural-historical frame of Chechen revolution propaganda was ideology of the Caucasus War. Young highlanders were the target group of the propaganda. They also became the main source of manpower mobilization. The second “cultural frame” and the tool of mobilization was “pure” Islam. The target group for this kind of political rhetoric was young people of the republican cities and lowland villages leading urban life. The traditional Islam was not good for mobilization of such a contingent because social status of a religious leader (at least of Qadiryya tariqa in its regional version) cannot give him a right to instruct a murid (an adept) for such an activity. So the Wahhabi structures were introduced into the republic. The competition for young people spirituality and loyalty became a real battlefield between tradition and Wahhabi militant communities. Within the cultural frame it was easy for the young men to rebel against the elder relatives’ authority and to leave homes in order to join ‘the right Muslim group’. In addition to financial support, they got a ready made moral codex and it was also very important in the period of ideological vacuum. The losses among young people were the most sensitive problem of revolting Chechnya.

For mobilization Chechen ideologists turned to the solidarity maintaining institutions which were used for social support during the deportation period. It was the third “cultural-historical frame” for mobilization. Simultaneously they try to ignore the revitalized network of Qadiriyya communities’ (Sufi Islam communities) structures as the oppositional to Wahhabi negative mobilization propaganda. They declared war to the leaders of different Muslim ritual communities. Pressing out traditional institutions from public space to the periphery of social life they ended with positive mobilization of the people and inter-group political dialog inside the Chechen society. But under the old names appeared innovations in which reflected cruel reality of war-for-oil oriented economy (so called Shari’a courts known by cutting hands and legs, stone-beating, feud, slave-trade, hostages, car-stealing and kidnapping). The ‘traditionalistic easternisation’ substituted possible ‘democratisation-westernisation’ of the society and created a new image of cruel and criminal highlander among Russian public. These ‘archaic’ innovations were not at all popular among Chechens and regarded by most population as ‘medieval savagery’. The other result was that the majority of urban population who could not leave the republic returned to agrarian occupations, the other became small traders; others produced oil
by crude methods and their children were standing along the roads with three-liter jugs of home-made fuel offering it to drivers. An attempt to turn the former Soviet autonomy into the North Caucasus oil-state Kuwait failed in spite of international ideological and military support from the West and the East.

CONCLUSION

The war had nothing to do with the nature of oil itself, but with the nature of contemporary socioeconomic local and global relations where oil is playing the crucial role. In old oil regions like Caucasus where the cultural-historical experience of interethnic relations was creating in connection with oil and land property a consequent problem appears: how the traditional property right is observed in the context of industrial development of the region and modernization of ethnic communities there.

The rapid rates of oil industry development were among the reasons of transformation of Vainakh unity. The fight for oil and land in the region favored the concentration of manpower in the lowland, imposed over the network of religious and sub-ethnic groups a division system of bigger social groups. The demands of oil production security aggravated interethnic tension and fixed xenophobic traditions of the national policy of Russia. The interests of monopolistic state capitalism of the Russian Empire influenced the land distribution in the oil region. Due to the development of oil industry the Vainakh population resident pattern changed several times during the 190 year period. Their subsistence structure fluctuated from agrarian to urban. Tradition of negative anti-state mobilization was based on the feeling of life instability, constant humiliation and socioeconomic deprivation. On the ‘oil wave’ the Islamic factor (‘easternisation’) became a political factor of state importance in Russia.

After the dissolution of Soviet state, the elite of Chechen-Ingush autonomy decided to get from the state as much benefits for themselves as possible, extracting them from the republican petrochemical industry. According to the declared economic policy, every Chechen would in the near future enjoy “the standards of life of the Kuwaiti people” and Chechen state will compensate people property losses of deportation and restore historic and socio-economic justice. Soon it became clear that the republican oil reserves were not sufficient for the new state wellbeing. The prosperity theory turned into the practice of violence, economic rivalry and predatory activity. The politics was conducting by ethno-social units structured into the networks and based on mutual reciprocation or economic dependence of its members. The political and business ‘new Chechen elite’ emerged just after Perestroika. It was recruited from the number of of Comsomol activists of Soviet time. The structures were responsible for conducting the politics of separatism and establishing monoethnic rule in the republic.
Economic fragmentation corroded the power institutions of the republic. Oil-barons rivalry launched the mechanisms of negative mobilization and began to destroy basic ethic paradigm of Vainakh self-identification. Sub-ethnic fragmentation started. Many people in Chechnya were not ready to approve the “commercial” bloodshed in their names. They opposed to the political innovations which were overburdened by archaic social practices, alien forms of ‘esternisation’ of local deeply modernized society, and criticized “the party of war” for preventing from real social modernization and democracy. Traditional brotherhoods’ (wirds) ideologists tried to oppose to the bloodshed exploring the idea borrowed from Qur’an that any rule comes from God. The representatives of new Muslim groups in Chechnya supported by Dudaev’s government answered by accusing them in non-Muslim behavior and violent actions trying to squeeze out Sufi Islam to the periphery of political and social life. The opposition of traditional brotherhoods to new Muslim groups has led to a new start of violence which resulted into complete spiritual fragmentation of the republic.

Chechen oil and territory are now primarily in hands of ethnic Chechens and Ingushes but the perspectives for the normalization life in Chechnya and especially Ingushetia are still vague.
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